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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLITICAL IN 
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 
S. Karthick Ramakrishnan* 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram** 
ABSTRACT 
This Article provides a systematic, empirical investigation of the genesis 
of state and local immigration regulations, discrediting the popular notion 
that they are caused by uneven demographic pressures across the country. It 
also proffers a novel theory to explain the proliferation of these policies and 
queries the implications of this new model for federalism analysis. The 
story we tell in this paper is both political and legal; understanding 
immigration politics uncovers vital truths about the recent rise of 
subnational involvement in a policy arena that courts and commentators 
have traditionally ascribed to the federal government. Thus, this article 
connects the proliferation of state and local regulation with the extra-
constitutional political institutions and key policy actors who prominently 
influence both federal and subfederal immigration lawmaking but who 
remain obscured in traditional, apolitical accounts. This recognition of the 
political dynamics of immigration law, we argue, fundamentally alters 
judicial, scholarly, and public evaluations of immigration federalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to elected officials and policy advocates, the United States is 
undergoing a period of unprecedented demographic change, with 
unauthorized immigrants flooding in and causing cultural and economic 
upheaval in states and localities unaccustomed to such transformations or 
overly burdened by an accelerated rate of change.1 For example, Lou 
Bartletta, mayor of a small city in central Pennsylvania that was among the 
earliest to pass a restrictive ordinance, testified to Congress that “[i]n 
Hazleton, illegal immigration is not some abstract debate about walls and 
amnesty, but it is a tangible, very real problem.”2 State and local 
immigration laws emerge as compelled solutions to these newfound and 
intractable policy challenges.3 Indicative of this trend are the much-
publicized enactments over the past five years in localities such as 
Hazleton, Pennsylvania; Spring Valley, Missouri; Farmer’s Branch, Texas; 
Escondido, California; and in states such as Arizona, Alabama, Georgia, 
and Mississippi.4 These jurisdictions are ostensibly responding to policy 
                                                                                                                            
1. In this paper, we will mostly refer to the class of persons of unauthorized immigrants, 
except when referring to the statements or actions of restrictionist actors who use the terms 
“illegal aliens” or “illegal immigrants.” Any reference to these persons is intended to mean a 
group that either entered without inspection or are otherwise out of status and unlawfully 
present in the United States. 
2. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Examining the Need for a Guest 
Worker Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11–13 (2006) 
(statement of Hon. Louis Barletta, Mayor, Hazleton, Pennsylvania).  
3. See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, Ordinance 2006-18 
(Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/hazleton_second 
ordinance.pdf. The subsequent litigation challenging the ordinance, however, resulted in 
enjoinment of the law. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. 
Ct. 2958 (2011). The U.S. Supreme Court forestalled a final decision on the case by remanding 
it to the federal appellate court for consideration in light of the Court’s recent decision in 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). See City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 
131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). In Whiting, the Court upheld an Arizona law requiring businesses in the 
state to verify the legal status of their employees. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985–86.  
4. H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011); S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2010), enjoined in part by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); H.B. 87, 151st 
Gen. Assemb. (Ga. 2011); H.B. 488, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2012); Escondido, Cal., 
Ordinance No. 2006-38 R (Oct. 18, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/ 
immigrants/escondido_ordinance.pdf, enjoined by Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 
1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006); Valley Park, Mo., An Ordinance Relating to Illegal Immigration Within 
the City of Valley Park, MO, Ordinance 1708 (July 17, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
files/pdfs/immigrants/valleypark_ordinance.pdf; Riverside, N.J., Illegal Immigration Relief Act, 
Ordinance 2006–16 (July 26, 2006); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 12, 2006), 
available at http://www.hazletoncity.org/090806/2006-18%20_Illegal%20Alien%20Immigr 
ation%20Relief%20Act.pdf; Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2903 (Jan. 22, 2007), available 
at https://www.farmersbranch.info/sites/default/files/Ordinance%20No%202903.pdf (last 
 
  
 
 
 
44:1431] THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLITICAL 1433 
problems like economic stress, increased language isolation, wage 
depression, and overcrowding.5 These laws regulate immigrants in several 
ways. To wit, they create immigration enforcement schemes; define new 
state immigration crimes; promote English-only policies; and regulate 
housing, public services, and employment of unauthorized migrants.6 
This demography-based explanation for state and local involvement is a 
familiar and intuitively appealing story relied upon by legal scholars, 
popular media, and elected officials alike. For example, Professor Cristina 
Rodriguez, in arguing for a functionalist understanding of local immigrant 
regulation, maintains that the demographic shifts caused by globalization 
and immigration “are felt differently in different parts of the country, and 
the disruption immigration causes, as well as the viability of different 
immigration strategies, will vary . . . .”7 Thus, divergent needs in localities 
lead to contrasting approaches towards integrating and regulating the effects 
of immigrants on local economies.8 Professor Clare Huntington writes that 
“changing immigration patterns that have brought non-citizens to new parts 
of the country . . . and to suburban and rural areas. . . . [I]t is notable that the 
more punitive immigration measures often, although not always, are 
enacted in areas new to receiving significant populations of non-citizens.”9 
Many media reports have also invoked this same wisdom of immigration-
induced changes leading inexorably to policy pressures and legislative 
action at the local level.10 
Importantly, elected officials and restriction advocates have paired these 
demographic claims with a complaint that the federal government has 
forsaken its constitutional and statutory responsibility to control unwanted 
immigration. In signing Arizona’s E-Verify law, then-Governor Janet 
                                                                                                                            
accessed Sept. 14, 2012) (held void and prohibited from being enforced in Villas at Parkside 
Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 2008)). 
5. Lou Barletta, Mayor of Hazleton, Pa., Speech to the City Council of Hazleton, Pa. 
(July 13, 2006) (claiming that undocumented individuals were sapping the city of resources) 
(transcript available at http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/node/7). 
6. See, e.g., Escondido, Cal., Ordinance No. 2006-38R (Oct. 18, 2006), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/escondido_ordinance.pdf (preventing landlords from 
renting or “harboring” illegal aliens in their property and imposing other related restrictions on 
rental and eviction proceedings). 
7. Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 567, 609 (2008). 
8. Id. at 594 (“Communities are also jumping on the enforcement bandwagon because 
they seek control over their rapidly changing environments.”). 
9. Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 787, 806 (2008). 
10. See, e.g., Alex Kotlowitz, Our Town, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007 (Magazine), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/magazine/05Immigration-t.html?pagewanted=all. 
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Napolitano (now Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security) 
declared: “Immigration is a federal responsibility, but I signed [the law] 
because it is now abundantly clear that Congress finds itself incapable of 
coping with the comprehensive immigration reforms our country needs.”11 
Unable to wait any longer for the federal government to seal the border and 
vigorously enforce provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act,12 
states and localities had to legislate to protect their residents and solve their 
impending demographic crisis. 
Undoubtedly, this conventional wisdom is appealing. However, it is, at 
best, an incomplete account of the rise of subnational immigration 
regulation; at worst, it is purposefully misleading. In prior empirical work, 
we cast doubt on the factual premise undergirding much of the new 
immigration federalism, showing that state and local immigration laws are 
not, as commonly assumed, policy responses tailored to immigration-
induced demographic problems.13 That is, the primary justifications 
undergirding most scholarly, political, and judicial explanations for this 
recent spate of state and local immigration regulations have little empirical 
support. Instead, restrictionist state and local laws are largely the product of 
political partisanship, with Republican-heavy areas especially ripe for 
political action. 
Building on these original statistical findings, this paper advances a new, 
dynamic theory of legislative action and inaction in immigration law. The 
key theoretical deficiency with prior explanations is that they analyze 
subnational policy proliferation and federal legislative stagnation as 
independent, unconnected trends. Furthermore, both occur in an apolitical 
context. By contrast, our proposed model—which we have termed the 
“Polarized Change” model—explains developments at both levels, with 
extra-constitutional political institutions (political parties) and key policy 
actors (issue entrepreneurs) that catalyze immigration lawmaking. In the 
Polarized Change model, party polarization and ethnic nationalism after 
9/11 present opportunities for more restrictive legislation on immigration, 
                                                                                                                            
11. Letter from Janet Napolitano, Governor of the State of Ariz., to Hon. Jim Weiers, 
Speaker of the House (July 2, 2007), available at http://www.countysupervisors.org/uploads/07-
07-02%20HB%202779%20Statement.pdf. 
12. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–05 (2012) (defining, inter alia, the 
class of persons who are unlawfully present and the process and standards for their discovery 
and removal). 
13. See infra Appendix; see also S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Tom Wong, Partisanship, 
Not Spanish: Explaining Municipal Ordinances Affecting Undocumented Immigrants, in 
TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES (Monica 
Varsanyi, ed. 2011).  
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and issue entrepreneurs press these advantages to push restrictionist 
legislation in jurisdictions with ripe political conditions. 
Our proposed mechanism offers a unique take on both the directionality 
and intentionality of immigration policymaking. We argue that federal 
inactivity and subfederal activity are linked and interdependent. Issue 
entrepreneurs coordinate work across government levels, stalemating 
Congressional action at important moments, and subsequently use this 
“failure” to justify the proliferation of policies at the subfederal level. The 
reimagined causality of the Polarized Change model is especially significant 
because these state and local laws emerge within the constitutional context 
of presumed federal primacy in the field. Enacting restrictive policies in 
several jurisdictions normalizes the constitutional appropriateness of state 
and local participation in immigration regulation. Accordingly, our revised 
genesis story requires a change in commentators’ and courts’ evaluation of 
the federalism dynamics inherent in state and local immigration regulation.  
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly presents the empirical 
foundation of subfederal immigration policy proliferation, summarizing the 
data and conclusions from our nationwide study of jurisdictions that have 
passed restrictionist laws. Part II presents the Polarized Change model of 
immigration regulation, focusing on the key role of issue entrepreneurs and 
their use of party polarization and ethnic nationalism to promote a 
restrictionist agenda. Here, the Article situates issue entrepreneurs and their 
work within the legal, theoretical framework of legislative cascades and 
political process analysis, highlighting examples of restrictionist legislative 
activity over the past twelve years. Finally, Part III offers preliminary 
thoughts on the impact of the Polarized Change model on federalism 
debates. 
Fundamentally, this Article calls for a revision of the conventional 
narrative for the rise of subnational immigration regulation, and it suggests 
a cohesive, empirically-based alternative for the phenomenon. It uniquely 
contributes both legal doctrinal analysis and political science research to the 
field of immigration federalism, and it may have broader ramifications for 
federalism analysis generally. Professors Daryl Levinson and Richard 
Pildes in a recent article argued that constitutional separation of powers 
analysis is bankrupt without an account of the importance of political 
parties in creating competition or cooperation between branches of the 
federal government.14 Also, Dean Larry Kramer has long maintained that 
                                                                                                                            
14. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2314 (2006) (“[T]he invisibility of political parties has left constitutional 
discourse about separation of powers with no conceptual resources to understand basic features 
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political parties are the connective tissue binding federal and state actors, 
accounting for subfederal concerns in the federal process.15 While they 
address different ideas and devices for diffusing national power, the 
underlying message of both analyses is that theorists must look beyond 
formal constitutional structures and should study political realities and 
organizations to fully appreciate basic elements of our constitutional 
design.16 In this tradition, we place the focus squarely on the political and 
extra-legal dimension of immigration lawmaking, arguing that 
understanding it is indispensable to judicial, scholarly, and public 
evaluations of state and local involvement. 
I. THE EMPIRICAL VALIDITY OF THE CONVENTIONAL MODEL OF STATE 
AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION REGULATION 
The accelerated flurry of subnational lawmaking over the past decade is 
notable because it occurs against a background context of presumed federal 
primacy in immigration matters.17 Since the late nineteenth century, aside 
from niche areas in which subnational jurisdictions are permitted to enact 
legislation affecting immigrants, federal law has displaced state and local 
enactments regulating the entry, exit, conditions of stay of immigrants, and 
                                                                                                                            
of the American political system. It has also generated judicial decisions and theoretical 
rationalizations that float entirely free of any functional justification grounded in the actual 
workings of separation of powers.”). 
15. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalsim, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219 (2000) (“Rather than the formal constitutional 
structures highlighted in Wechsler’s original analysis, federalism . . . has been safeguarded by a 
complex system of informal political institutions (of which political parties have historically 
been the most important) . . . .”). 
16. Id. at 285 (arguing that several institutions and dynamics, including political parties, 
administrative bureaucracy, the intergovernmental lobby, and states, as recruiting and training 
grounds, contribute to effective protection of states in the federalist system). 
17. While state and local laws regulating movement and fitness for community residence 
once were commonplace during the nineteenth century in the absence of federal law, after the 
Civil War, Congress began asserting federal dominion over the field. See, e.g., Gerald L. 
Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
1833 (1993). Since that time, immigration regulation has been primarily a federal exercise, see 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 
U.S. 259 (1875), and Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875), with some limited leeway for 
subnational legislation that affects immigrants. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 
1968 (2011) (upholding state E-Verify law for businesses); Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) 
(devolving decisions over public assistance eligibility on the basis of citizenship status to 
states); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (upholding state law prohibiting non-citizens 
from becoming state troopers). 
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the enforcement of such laws.18 More recently, however, states and 
localities have renewed their interest in immigration regulation. The 
National Council of State Legislatures reports over 7,000 state immigration 
proposals over the last five years.19 States and localities are increasingly 
considering and passing laws that create state immigration crimes, enact 
state immigration enforcement schemes, regulate the renting of property to 
certain noncitizens, penalize businesses for hiring unauthorized workers, 
and discriminate in the provision of public services.20 In most instances, the 
stated aim of this restrictive legislation is to discourage entry or residence of 
unauthorized immigrants, or what many restrictionists have called “attrition 
through enforcement.”21 
A. The Conventional Model  
The conventional explanation for the recent spate of state and local laws 
should be familiar to anyone paying attention to immigration policy. It 
holds that policy stalemate at the federal level, combined with the pressure 
created by the public policy challenges of recent and rapid demographic 
changes, compel states and localities to legislate in a field they have no 
choice but to enter. This sentiment was neatly encapsulated by Governor 
Jan Brewer of Arizona in her signing statement accompanying the passage 
of S.B. 1070, the law creating a state immigration enforcement scheme and 
providing state criminal penalties for immigration violations (recently 
enjoined, in part, by the Supreme Court22): 
The bill I’m about to sign into law – Senate Bill 1070 – represents 
another tool for our state to use as we work to solve a crisis we did 
not create and the federal government has refused to fix….The 
crisis caused by illegal immigration and Arizona’s porous border. 
                                                                                                                            
18. Neuman, supra note 17, at 1896–97. 
19. NCSL 2011 Report on State Immigration Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=23960 (last visited Oct. 15, 2012).  
20. State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-laws-related-to-immigration-
and-immigrants.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) (summarizing immigration legislation 
introduced in state legislative bodies). 
21. Arizona’s SB1070 explicitly invoked this frame in Section 1 of the law: “The 
legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public 
policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona.” S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Ariz. 2010).  
22. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). (enjoining three out of four 
challenged provisions, but declining to enjoin provision directing police officers to determine 
immigration status on lawful stops and arrests). 
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We in Arizona have been more than patient waiting for 
Washington to act. But decades of federal inaction and misguided 
policy have created a dangerous and unacceptable situation.
23
 
Notably, Governor Pete Wilson conjured this same rhetoric when framing 
the need for California’s Proposition 187 in 1994.24 Wilson promoted the 
so-called “Save Our State Initiative” by depicting California as the victim of 
federal failure.25 
The conventional model of subnational immigration regulation is 
represented in Figure 1 below: 
                                                                                                                            
23. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Statement by Governor Jan Brewer on the 
signing of Senate Bill 1070 (Apr. 23, 2010), available at http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/ 
PR_042310_StatementByGovernorOnSB1070.pdf; see also Letter from Janet Napolitano, 
Governor of the State of Ariz., to Hon. Jim Weiers, Speaker of the House, (July 2, 2007), 
available at http://www.countysupervisors.org/uploads/07-07-02%20HB%202779%20Statem 
ent.pdf. (“Immigration is a federal responsibility, but I signed HB 2779 because it is now 
abundantly clear that Congress finds itself incapable of coping with the comprehensive 
immigration reforms our country needs.”).  
24. Proposition 187, codified in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (excluding 
undocumented individuals from receiving any health care services from publicly-funded health 
care facilities, except emergency medical care as required by federal law, and requiring that 
facilities notify and provide information to the State Director of Health Services, the California 
Attorney General, and the INS regarding undocumented individuals who seek health care 
services); see also OFFICE OF THE CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET GEN. 
ELECTION NOV. 8, 1994, 54–55 (1994), available at http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/ 
1994g.pdf (containing argument in favor of proposition 187 and rebuttal). 
25. See Peter Skerry, Many Borders to Cross: Is Immigration the Exclusive Responsibility 
of the Federal Government?, 25 PUBLIUS (ISSUE 3) 71, 72 (1995). 
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Figure 1. Conventional Model of Subnational Immigration Legislation 
 
The chief virtue of the conventional model is its simplicity and intuitive 
appeal;26 in other words, it just seems right. In addition to the widespread 
acceptance that immigration policy has reached a stalemate at the national 
level, it also makes intuitive sense that rapid migration and demographic 
change are causing significant social dislocation and prompting 
redistribution of some public goods. First, current economic studies suggest 
that the fiscal benefits of immigration are more likely to be concentrated at 
the national level while any short-term fiscal costs are more likely to be 
borne by specific localities, particularly with respect to the provision of 
public education, social services, and emergency room care.27 
Second, it is evident that immigrants in recent years have been moving to 
“new destinations”—areas with little or no history of immigrant settlement 
in the past century.28 The emergence of these new destinations helps 
augment the narrative of rapid, recent demographic change that many 
assume to cause state and local legislative reactions. These settlement 
                                                                                                                            
26. While some may argue that the conventional understanding also includes an 
appreciation of the role of politics, infra Part II, we explore the heretofore limited theoretical 
and empirical development of these claims. 
27. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON POPULATION & BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES AND 
EDUCATION, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF 
IMMIGRATION (James P Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997). 
28. Audrey Singer, Susan Wiley Hardwick & Caroline B. Brettell, TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY GATEWAYS: IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (Brookings 
Institution Press, 2008). These so-called “new destinations” include places ranging from rural 
Kansas and North Carolina to suburbs in Long Island and Georgia that have had little recent 
history of immigration. 
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patterns have brought renewed attention to issues such as day laborers, 
unlicensed businesses, overcrowded housing, and illegal immigration. And, 
judging from news coverage of conflicts and tensions in these new 
destination areas, the presence and growth of low-skilled (and often 
unauthorized) immigrant populations would seem to pose challenges for 
local governance.29 
Upon closer evidentiary analysis, however, this conventional model does 
not hold. In our other work, we constructed a dataset of over 25,000 
municipalities and all fifty states and, using multivariate regression analysis, 
tested the salience of various factors hypothesized to induce state and local 
policy response on immigration.30 As summarized below in Appendix A, 
our analysis revealed that the demographic factors commonly assumed to 
spur subfederal policy responses were not salient in predicting or explaining 
the recent rise of such regulations. Instead, contexts of local partisanship 
emerged as the highly salient factor explaining the spread of these laws, 
with Republican-heavy areas much more likely to pass restrictive legislation 
than Democrat-heavy areas. 
Republican-heavy areas proved to be significant because they provide 
ripe opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to propose and pass policies by 
framing undocumented immigration as one of the most significant problems 
for local governance. For instance, in 2006 and 2007, six cities in California 
(Apple Valley, Costa Mesa, Escondido, Lancaster, Santa Clarita, and Vista) 
passed restrictive ordinances on matters ranging from day laborers to 
                                                                                                                            
29. See, e.g., Paul Vitello, As Illegal Workers Hit Suburbs, Politicians Scramble to 
Respond, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/06/nyregion/ 
06immigrate.html; Bob Dart, Minutemen Shadow Town’s Day Labor Site, ATLANTA J. CONST., 
April 5, 2006, http://www.galeo.org/story.php?story_id=0000001057. 
30. See S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Tom Wong, Partisanship, Not Spanish: Explaining 
Municipal Ordinances Affecting Undocumented Immigrants, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: 
IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES (Monica Varsanyi, ed. 2011); 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: Its Political 
Underpinnings and Legal Implications (working title) (manuscript in preparation); see also 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Restrictive State and Local Immigration 
Laws: Solutions in Search of Problems, American Constitution Society Issue Brief at 6–11 
(November 15, 2012) available at http://www.acslaw.org/publications/issue-briefs/restrictive-
state-and-local-immigration-laws-solutions-in-search-of-proble (summarizing empirical 
evaluation of the salience of the following factors proffered by scholars, judges media, and 
elected officials as causing state and local policy response: population of new immigrants and 
growth of Latino and foreign-born populations; high proportions of linguistically-isolated 
households; overcrowded housing; Latino share and naturalized share of the citizen population; 
economic stress and relative group deprivation; state-level policy climate; local economic 
interests; and party composition of the electorate.). 
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employers, and to landlords.31 These various municipalities shared little in 
the way of large-scale recent immigration or rapid changes in local 
unemployment, but they did share one common characteristic: electorates 
that leaned heavily Republican (with a party registration advantage ranging 
from sixteen percentage points to thirty percentage points in these cities) in 
a state where registered Democrats had an eight percentage-point advantage 
over Republicans.32 The political opportunities that Republican-heavy 
municipalities present to policy entrepreneurs on immigration restriction 
continued through 2010, as the Los Angeles Times reported on the 
successful attempts of a local tea party activist in getting Republican-heavy 
cities in Southern California such as Temecula and Murietta to pass 
restrictive measures after failing to do the same in larger, politically diverse 
cities such as Riverside and Ontario.33 
Finally, in cases where policy entrepreneurs are not involved in local 
efforts, political ambition may be a critical factor, as Republican-heavy 
districts offer the chance for primary challengers to mobilize party activists 
who care intensely about the issue of illegal immigration. This was evident 
in Arizona as far back as 2004 and 2006, as long-standing Republican 
incumbents such as Congressman Jim Kolbe faced competitive primary 
elections from challengers who focused on immigration and border-control 
issues.34 These intraparty dynamics continued through 2010, as Governor 
Jan Brewer and Senator John McCain tacked to the far right on immigration 
in order to fend off primary challengers.35 
                                                                                                                            
31. These are based on our data collection, which we describe in Appendix A. 
32. For State party registration data, see CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, REPORT OF REGISTRATION 
OCT. 23, 2006 (2006), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/15day-gen-
06/hist-reg-stats.pdf. Local party registration data for municipalities can be obtained from the 
firm Aristotle, Inc. 
33. Phil Willon, Conservative Inland Empire Cities Crack down on Illegal Workers, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/14/local/la-me-0212-e-verify-
20110214. 
34. See Joseph Lelyveld, The Border Dividing Arizona, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/magazine/15immigration.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
35. See Katie Cobb, Immigration Law Breathes Life Into Brewer’s Re-Election Campaign, 
FOX NEWS (June 12, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/06/10/immigration-law-
breathes-life-brewers-election-campaign/; Russell Goldman, John McCain Border Shift: 
“Complete Danged Fence”, ABC NEWS (May 11, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/john-
mccain-immigration-reversal-complete-danged-fence/story?id=10616090. 
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II. A POLITICAL THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION: THE POLARIZED 
CHANGE MODEL 
While partisanship has a statistically stronger relationship than various 
demographic factors in explaining legislative change, completing the 
analysis requires us to determine how these political factors actually work 
to produce such policy expressions. Notably, the kinds of political 
explanations we offer here need to go beyond ad-hoc pronouncements on 
the importance of politics, which have pointed to disparate factors such as 
political interest groups,36 legacies of Jim Crow,37 and racial gaps between 
voters and residents.38 Instead, we use the conclusions drawn from our 
statistical findings to develop a more nuanced “polarized change” model of 
subnational immigration regulation, proffering our theory on why 
partisanship matters and how the political process has shaped both federal 
and state legislative efforts. This new model, grounded in theoretical 
frameworks provided by legal and political science scholarship, accounts 
for our findings on partisanship and demography. It also incorporates 
qualitative evidence gathered from news reports, interviews, and 
congressional dynamics that highlight the work of selected policy activists 
in immigration law. 
The conventional model described in Part I is not just lacking 
empirically; it is also lacking theoretically. It seeks to reduce the 
phenomenon of state and local action to the combination of policy pressures 
from below that confronts legislative inaction from above. But, in the case 
of immigration policy, the status quo of legislative inaction is not the same 
as having a blank policy slate on immigration. Since nearly its founding, the 
federal government has passed legislation on citizenship and naturalization, 
and since 1952, it has relied on the Immigration Nationality Act, with many 
statutory provisions that have been added or amended over the years.39 In 
                                                                                                                            
36. Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NPR (Oct. 28, 
2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/10/28/130833741/prison-economics-help-drive-ariz-immigrati 
on-law. Notably, NPR has retracted one of the central claims made in the piece regarding the 
role of the Corrections Corporation of America.  
37. Martin Luther King III & Richard Trumka, Alabama’s Immigration Law: Jim Crow 
Revisited, CNN.COM (Nov. 17, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/17/opinion/ 
trumka-king-civil-rights-alabama/index.html. 
38. Daniel Gonzalez, SB 1070 Backlash Spurs Hispanics to Join Democrats, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, June 8, 2010 (“Arizona is different [from California] in that . . . the Latino vote is 
lower, about 12 percent versus 21 percent.”). 
39. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 
(abolishing the national original quota system in favor of annual Eastern and Western 
Hemisphere ceilings); Farm Labor Contractor Registration Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
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addition to statutory provisions on the matter, immigration is also subject to 
the various regulatory provisions and enforcement priorities of the 
executive branch and subject to congressional oversight and budgetary 
authority. By contrast, the status quo on issues such as publicity rights or 
driverless vehicles are truly “blank slates” at the national level, with no 
federal statutory or regulatory provisions on the matter. 
Moreover, in defining federal failure, restrictionists have discounted the 
role of the federal executive, focusing solely on the activity of the 
legislature.40 Thus, discretionary decisions by the President and the 
Department of Homeland Security to prioritize enforcement and tolerate 
some level of unlawful presence and migration are necessarily—and 
understandably—absent from restrictionists’ description of federal 
dynamics. Federal gridlock is therefore exclusively framed as congressional 
gridlock, and legislative enactment is promoted as the only constitutionally 
significant aspect of federal immigration policy. 
Defenders of the conventional model of subnational legislation may 
concede that there is no policy vacuum on immigration at the national level 
but still contend that existing federal laws and regulations, many enacted 
decades ago, are ill-equipped to solve the policy challenges posed by recent 
immigrants, particularly low-skilled, unauthorized immigrants from 
Mexico. However, as we have already seen, the empirical evidence offers 
little to support the contention that restrictive legislation is more common in 
places with recent arrivals, or with more Mexican immigrants, or with more 
Spanish-dominant households, or with more objective conditions for labor 
competition between immigrants and the native born.41 
Second, as many established models in the literature on public policy and 
public opinion have shown, policy problems are not self-evident. Rather, 
they depend on problem definition, attribution of blame, and political 
                                                                                                                            
93-518, 88 Stat. 1652 (adding a criminal penalty for farm labor contractors who knowingly hire 
undocumented workers); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 
(changing the preference system for admission of immigrants to the United States and providing 
for administrative naturalization). 
40. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 809, 844 (2007) (“Both the public debate and existing scholarship typically view 
illegal immigration as an enforcement problem that needs to be solved. The high level of illegal 
immigration is seen as reflecting the government’s failure to enforce the existing immigration 
rules.”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, 
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil–Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1827–42 (2011) 
(noting that while legislation potentially identifies several million removable persons, other 
aspects of the enforcement system—arrest, prosecution, and adjudication—only deal with a 
fraction of that pool). 
41. See infra Appendix B., Table B1.  
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mobilization.42 As we have already demonstrated from our cross-sectional 
analysis of localities and states, policy challenges related to increased 
immigration constitute neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause for 
restrictive legislative action at the subnational level. Furthermore, economic 
rationales that stress the importance of wage competition and local fiscal 
pressures are unable to account for the fact that restrictive efforts at the 
local level rose sharply in 2006, during a time of low unemployment and 
booming economic growth. 
Finally, the conventional explanation assumes the existence of federal 
failure, but provides no empirical or theoretical explanation for federal 
inaction. If the factors that explain federal inaction on new immigration 
legislation are wholly unrelated to the factors that can explain local action, 
then having a two-tiered explanation may be sufficient—with partisan 
gridlock explaining the former and demographic factors explaining the 
latter. However, we find that this is not the case. Indeed, as we argue in the 
next section, two sets of factors—what we characterize as party polarization 
and ethnic nationalism—when mobilized by issue entrepreneurs, account 
for both federal inaction and the rise in subnational legislation, and thus 
have greater explanatory value than attempts to describe the two sets of 
phenomena in a piecemeal manner.  
In response, as an alternative to the empirically and theoretically lacking 
conventional model, we propose a model of polarized change that 
incorporates our findings on the saliency of partisanship and allows for the 
possibility that a single mechanism influences both national and subnational 
dynamics. The Polarized Change model draws on major theoretical 
traditions in the public policy scholarship on legislative change, such as the 
multiple streams tradition and the punctuated equilibrium framework of 
policy change,43 and relates it to existing work in legal scholarship on 
legislative cascades44 and private lawmaking.45 Much like in these other 
frameworks, we argue in our model of polarized change that the entire 
process of policy change on immigration—from opinion formation among 
                                                                                                                            
42. Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws 
That Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2010); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); Michael Mintrom, 
Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 738, 765–66 (1997). 
43. See generally JOHN W KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 
(1984); FRANK BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS (1993). 
44. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42. 
45. See Barak Y. Orbach et al., Arming States’ Rights: Federalism, Private Lawmakers, 
and the Battering Ram Strategy, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1161 (2010). 
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voters to agenda setting and legislation at the national and subnational 
levels—is shaped powerfully by the work of political parties and issue 
entrepreneurs (those who do the work of promoting the salience of a 
particular issue, offering particular frames for understanding those issues, 
providing particular solutions, and identifying opportunities and venues for 
policy change). 
Our framework highlights the influence of these issue entrepreneurs in 
creating optimal conditions for subnational immigration regulation, framing 
the narrative necessary for judicial and political acceptance of restrictionist 
legislation, and targeting specific jurisdictions with partisan conditions that 
are ripe for enacting such regulation, with an eye to more widespread 
adoption. The key insight with this model is the connectedness—the unitary 
nature—of both the dynamics at the federal and subfederal levels. Instead of 
conceiving of these two aspects as independently moving parts, we suggest 
that both are influenced concurrently. The stalling of the one (federal 
legislation) provides the constitutional and political leverage for activity at 
the other (state and local policies). Further, our alternate model showcases 
how issue entrepreneurs have been able to intensify interparty polarization 
and post-9/11 ethnic nationalism to effectively promote their causes.To be 
clear, our description of this process is not intended, by itself, as a negative 
judgment on the work of these entrepreneurs; rather, we seek to present a 
more realistic appraisal of the mechanism producing subnational 
immigration regulation. 
A. Description of the Polarized Change Model 
The underlying premise of the Polarized Change model is that policy 
challenges resulting from demographic change do not inexorably produce 
legislative efforts at policy change. Calls for policy change emerge even 
without underlying objective conditions such as rapidly growing immigrant 
populations (these are not necessary conditions); further, objective 
conditions often do not lead to efforts at local legislation (these are not 
sufficient conditions).What is more important than the objective basis for a 
policy problem is its perceived existence and importance among those who 
are critical to the legislative process.46 
                                                                                                                            
46. See generally Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 741–47 (arguing that cognitive 
biases—like susceptibility to availability cascades, in which limited, available information 
becomes dominant and accepted—that affect officials and those advocating for change can lead 
to suboptimal policy outcomes); Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens Care About 
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In Figure 2, we situate the role of issue entrepreneurs in the larger 
process of immigration policy change.While one may typically think of 
elected representatives as key actors on legislation, we show that in the case 
of state and local legislation on immigration, issue entrepreneurs play an 
outsized role. These key actors coordinate action across local jurisdictions 
and between levels of government. In various jurisdictions, restrictionist 
issue entrepreneurs also create model legislation that can be easily 
mimicked, and they craft such legislation to test the limits of constitutional 
constraints at the subfederal level.47 Critically, based on our empirical 
analysis and theoretical reasoning, we eliminate the “demographic change 
and public policy problems” found in Figure 1 (Conventional Model), and 
we replace it with the “perceived existence of policy problem,” 
underscoring the subjective nature of such claims and their production 
through a process of politicization.48 
To be clear, we are not claiming that issue entrepreneurs are solely 
responsible for the way that immigration policy has developed at the 
national and local level since 2001. Instead, they play a central role in 
taking advantage of opportunities that are themselves generated by two 
other historical and institutional factors: party polarization (which includes 
the rise of interparty divisions in Washington D.C. after 2000 and the 
elimination of moderates within the Republican Party through competitive 
party primaries after 2004) and ethnic nationalism (which encapsulates the 
twin rise in racial and cultural antipathy in immigration discourse and 
concerns about homeland security after the September 11, 2001 attacks). As 
we show in the next section, party polarization presented the opportunity to 
shift immigration policy away from a bargaining dynamic among varied 
interest groups and legislators where compromise is possible to a pattern of 
entrenchment where interparty divisions engender gridlock through the use 
of filibusters.49 And the rise of national security concerns presented 
                                                                                                                            
Federalism? An Experimental Test, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 589 (2007) (arguing that 
framing of problems by “elites” affects how citizenry views a problem and its solution). 
47. See, e.g., Immigration Reform Law Institute, Model Federal, State, and Local Laws, 
available at http://irli.org/laws; IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE, PRO-ENGLISH MODEL 
LOCAL ORDINANCE (2006), available at http://irli.org/system/files/Pro-English%20Model% 
20OEO.pdf. 
48. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
49. See generally DANIEL TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES (2002) (arguing that the extent to 
which parties can prevent “strange bedfellow” coalitions depends, to some extent, to whether 
the issue at hand has one dimension on which parties can differentiate, or two dimensions that 
typically lead to instability in decisionmaking). On issues of low public salience, such as tax 
policy, Congressional logrolls along committee lines and interest group access can play more 
prominent roles. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 193–223 (1990). 
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opportunities to expand the rhetorical scope of ethnic nationalism and its 
salience to a wider population. 
Figure 2. Polarized Change Model of Subnational Immigration Legislation 
 
 
Still, the mere existence of these two factors does not automatically lead 
to policy change. In most cases, immigration issue entrepreneurs remain the 
critical actors: they challenged moderate Republicans well before the Tea 
Party’s rise in 2009, they helped to shift immigration policy from an interest 
group bargain to a partisan stalemate, and they were early champions of this 
“border security” variant of ethnic nationalism, mobilizing constituents and 
pressuring legislators to resist the existential threat represented by 
immigrants.50 In addition to capitalizing on these factors to block bipartisan 
legislation at the national level, these issue entrepreneurs have also played 
an important role at the subnational level: identifying the places where 
                                                                                                                            
50. See, e.g., Shortfalls of the 1986 Immigration Reform Legislation: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 10 (2007) (statement of Rosemary Jenks, Director of Government 
Relations, NumbersUSA) (describing terrorists gaming the U.S. immigration system), available 
at https://www.numbersusa.com/content/files/pdf/2007-04-19%201986%20IRCA%20Mista 
kes.pdf. 
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opportunities are greatest, offering model legislation and political counsel to 
ensure legislative passage, and lending legal expertise to ensure that the 
provisions have a colorable constitutional basis.51 
B. The Polarized Change Model in Theory and Practice 
In this section, we flesh out the details of the Polarized Change model as 
it applies to immigration legislation at the national and subnational levels. 
First, we use existing theoretical frameworks on policy proliferation and 
federalism dynamics to identify and describe the class of key policy actors 
we call issue entrepreneurs. Then, we provide a few examples from the past 
decade of issue entrepreneurs in action, noting the two contextual factors 
that have structured the opportunities for legislative change on immigration 
since 2001: the rise of party polarization and ethnic nationalism. 
To develop this narrative, we take a close look at key instances of 
Congressional and subnational immigration action. Thus, complementing 
the quantitative data used to discredit the demographic explanations of the 
conventional model, here we analyze qualitative data from news reports and 
in-depth interviews to show how issue entrepreneurs work in the 
immigration legislative landscape.52 Our analysis here gets into the minutiae 
of the policy and political work of key actors and events in immigration 
lawmaking. This rich description of the political capture and mechanism of 
policy change is vital to understanding the deficits of the conventional 
model and evaluating the difference the polarized change model makes for 
constitutional evaluation of subnational policy. 
1. The Agents of Polarized Change—Restrictionist Issue 
Entrepreneurs 
Who are these issue entrepreneurs on immigration, and how did they 
mobilize and coordinate action at the national and local levels? One way to 
think of these actors would be to include those whose activism has 
                                                                                                                            
51. See infra Part II.B. 
52. Our counterfactual analysis suggests that without the work of these vital actors, the 
immigration landscape—both nationally and subnationally—would appear drastically different. 
That is, without these actors, we would expect to have passed comprehensive immigration 
reform, and decreases in subnational immigration policymaking. Due to space constraints, our 
discussion of the qualitative findings is abridged here. For more the role of party polarization, 
ethnic nationalism, and issue entrepreneurs. See generally KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, 
POLARIZED CHANGE: THE POLITICIZATION OF U.S. IMMIGRATION AT THE STATE AND LOCAL 
LEVEL (working title) (manuscript in preparation). 
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generated national news, and who seek to influence policy on immigration 
beyond their immediate jurisdiction. Such a definition, however, would 
produce a list that is extremely long, including: local representatives such 
as Lou Barletta (former mayor of Hazleton, PA); law enforcement officials 
such as Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County, AZ; state legislators such as 
Russell Pearce (R-AZ) and Virgil Peck (R-KS); governors such as Jan 
Brewer (R-AZ) and Robert Bentley (R-AL); U.S. Representatives such as 
Tom Tancredo (R-CO), Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI), and Steve King (R-IA); 
advocacy groups such as the Federation for American Immigration Reform 
and NumbersUSA; research organizations such as the Center for 
Immigration Studies; national radio personalities such as Glenn Beck, John 
Kobylt, and Kenneth Chiampou; television personalities such as Lou Dobbs 
(formerly of CNN) and Bill O’Reilly (Fox News); legal advocates such as 
Kris Kobach’ and other organizations such as the American Legislative 
Exchange Council whose concerns lie well beyond immigration but who 
have nonetheless played a role in coordinating restrictive legislative efforts 
across states on the issue. 
Such a broad definition is not only unwieldy from an empirical 
perspective, it is also unhelpful for our theoretical model of polarized 
change, which reserves the label of issue entrepreneur for those actors who 
have been involved at both levels and have been central to proliferation at 
the subnational level (Figure 2). While we acknowledge that all these 
players influence immigration policy, we focus on this narrower set because 
of their multilevel reach and forward-thinking legislative strategy. As we 
argue in Part III, the activities of these actors are much more consequential 
for considerations of federalism because they challenge standard 
assumptions that undergird federalism analysis generally and immigration 
federalism analysis specifically. 
We arrive at a narrower, theoretically cogent set of actors by applying 
and modifying existing legal frameworks for policy instantiation. Using 
Professors Sunstein and Kuran’s work on availability cascades,53 Professor 
Catherine Carpenter’s elucidation of policy proliferation,54 and Michael 
Mintrom’s work on policy entrepreneurs,55 we establish the following key 
criteria for identifying restrictionist issue entrepreneurs for our model. First, 
issue entrepreneurs take advantage of limited public knowledge about 
immigration policy and problems. Relatedly, they link restrictionist policy 
goals with the rhetoric of state and local autonomy. Third, they are able to 
                                                                                                                            
53. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42. 
54. Carpenter, supra note 42. 
55. Mintrom, supra note 42. 
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recruit the wider set of actors described above to their cause. Finally, these 
actors work in a network, each specializing in a set of tasks that, when 
coordinated with other entrepreneurs, leads to policy proliferation at the 
local level and timely legislative gridlock at the national level. 
Applying this framework, the identities and achievements of 
restrictionist issue entrepreneurs comes into clearer focus. Based on their 
consistent and influential work, we identify five key entrepreneurial 
individuals and organizations: (1) Tom Tancredo (U.S. Representative from 
Colorado and a 2008 presidential candidate), (2) Kris Kobach (legal counsel 
to restrictionist organizations and jurisdictions and coauthor of Arizona’s 
SB1070 law), (3) Lou Dobbs (former host of a prime-time CNN program), 
and the organizations, (4) the Federation for American Immigration Reform 
(FAIR), and (5) NumbersUSA. Below, we first amplify the theoretical 
foundation of our selection of these particular entrepreneurs. Second, to 
familiarize readers, we provide a brief description of each of these key 
figures and the roles they’ve played in national and subnational immigration 
policy over the past decade. 
The idea of interested private parties and organization that coalesce 
around an issue or cause and then employ various methods to influence 
public policy related to that cause is well-studied.56 These descriptions 
distinguish a distinct species of policy actors who seek policy change by 
helping frame challenges, disseminating information (or misinformation), 
networking across jurisdictional lines, and raising money for such 
                                                                                                                            
56. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 17 (2010); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve 
the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2007); Harold Hongju Koh, The 
1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998) 
(describing the influence of norm entrepreneurs in changing domestic attitudes about equality); 
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 687 (describing social agents who understand availability 
heuristics and attempt to trigger availability cascades to achieve policy goals); Mintrom, supra 
note 42, at 739 (identifying policy entrepreneurs as a class of policy actors who seek dynamic 
policy change, and noting that policies are more likely to be considered and approved when 
such actors are present); Orbach et al., supra note 45, at 1163 (discussing the work of private 
lawmakers who use gun rights as a policy-vehicle to effect a broader states’ rights platform); 
Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 90 (1999) (describing 
persons who are eager to exploit group pathologies to achieve an end). Indeed, even the use of 
the term “entrepreneur” to describe that population has been prominent in the literature. Both 
legal and political science commentators have identified the work and importance of 
“availability entrepreneurs,” “policy entrepreneurs,” “political entrepreneurs,” “social 
entrepreneurs,” “norm entrepreneurs,” and “private lawmakers” in galvanizing lawmaking.  
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activities.57 Other scholars have even noted immigration entrepreneurs (Kris 
Kobach) by name.58 
The “issue entrepreneurs” we identify in the Polarized Change model are 
the evolved descendants of these political actors. The descriptor “issue” 
emphasizes that these actors appear to truly care about, and believe in, the 
substantive restrictionist position they attempt to achieve. Immigration issue 
entrepreneurs do not seem to be using a restrictionist agenda as a 
convenient vehicle to activate a broader states or local rights platform.59 As 
such, they not only promote their policy vision at the subfederal level, they 
concurrently undermine other state and local efforts aimed at integrating or 
ameliorating conditions for unauthorized immigrants.60 In other words, they 
care about state and local power only to the extent it serves their substantive 
policy goals. 
The work of restrictionist issue entrepreneurs at the subnational level is a 
real-time illustration of Professors Sunstein’s and Kuran’s analysis of the 
influence of information deficits and reputational concerns on public 
policy.61 As they note, in a policy debate, sometimes advocates for the 
objectively weaker or even empirically incorrect side can triumph in the 
legislative and political sphere by exploiting the cognitive biases of the 
public and elected officials.62 In such cascades, interested persons take 
                                                                                                                            
57. See, e.g., Mintrom, supra note 42, at 739–41; Orbach et al., supra note 45, at 1167; 
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 714. 
58. Orbach et al., supra note 45, at 1163 (noting that federal policies in immigration are 
prime targets for private lawmakers) and at 1166 (identifying former law professor, and now 
elected official, Kris Kobach as a private lawmaker in the immigration field). 
59. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 56, at 36 (“Few with influence in the political process care 
about promoting state power as an end in itself.”). But see Orbach et al., supra note 45, at 1178 
(arguing that private lawmakers in the gun rights area use those laws as a way to return the 
Supreme Court to a pre-New Deal Congressional power jurisprudence). 
60. The Immigration Reform Law Institute, the legal arm of the Federation for American 
Immigration Reform, challenged the provision of in-state tuition for unauthorized immigrant 
students and municipal identification cards for all city residents regardless of their immigration 
status. John Coté, Judge Tosses Challenge to S.F. ID Card Plan, S.F. CHRON., October 15, 
2008, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Judge-tosses-challenge-to-S-F-ID-card-plan-32653 
62.php; David Savage, Supreme Court Allows California to Grant In-State Tuition to Illegal 
Immigrants, LA TIMES, June 6, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/06/news/sc-dc-0607-
court-tuition-20110607. 
61. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 685–701 (discussing how availability cascades 
can generate widespread mistaken beliefs because of informational availability and reputational 
concerns, and the susceptibility of the public and elected officials to cognitive biases in 
information processes). 
62. Id. at 714; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to 
Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (2001) (describing how, in the absence of their own private 
information, people tend to follow others, and this process helps reach extreme policy 
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advantage of limited, and often incorrect, information about an issue or 
apparent problem to drive public policy.63 Foremost amongst the 
informational deficits exploited by restrictionist issue entrepreneurs are the 
generally held beliefs that undergird the conventional model of subnational 
regulation: that, in any particular jurisdiction, immigrants are causing 
uniquely insurmountable public policy programs that require restrictionist 
legal responses—in other words, the same propositions undermined by our 
empirical inquiry. 
These informational claims, however, are particularly sticky, persisting 
despite the experience of jurisdictions passing immigration legislation—
from Riverside, New Jersey, and the states of Oklahoma and Alabama—
which have all suffered greater economic distress after the legislation 
passed and subsequently drove out labor and consumer sources.64 Similarly, 
the idea of immigrant criminality motivating laws like Arizona’s SB 1070,65 
has been proven to be a “myth.”66 Despite a marked drop in violent crime in 
Arizona, issue entrepreneurs, as purveyors and disseminators of 
immigration “facts,” have consistently galvanized receptive constituencies 
                                                                                                                            
positions); Talley, supra note 56, at 90 (discussing how “social entrepreneurs” are eager to 
exploit group pathologies). 
63. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 685–701; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative 
Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (2001) (describing how, in the 
absence of their own private information, people tend to follow others, and this process helps 
reach extreme policy positions); Talley, supra note 56, at 90 (discussing how “social 
entrepreneurs” are eager to exploit group pathologies). 
64. See Patrik Jonsson, Why Republicans Are Doing an About-face on Tough Alabama 
Immigration Law, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 16, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
USA/Politics/2011/1116/Why-Republicans-are-doing-an-about-face-on-tough-Alabama-immigr
ation-law (“Prof. Samuel Addy at the Center for Business and Economic Research at the 
University of Alabama recently predicted that HB 56 will reduce the Alabama economy by $40 
million as income and spending by both illegal and legal Hispanic immigrants will decline. 
What's more, employers face troves of fresh paperwork and licensing requirements to comply 
with the law that they say will potentially hurt business.”); Peter J. Spiro, Be Careful What You 
Wish For, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/04/ 
should-alabama-schools-help-catch-illegal-immigrants/be-careful-what-you-wish-for-alabama 
(arguing that Alabama’s law, driving out immigrants, will force the state to learn the importance 
of immigrants to its economic well-being); PBS NewsHour: Alabama’s Immigration Law: 
Assessing the Economic, Social Impact (PBS broadcast Oct. 13, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec11/alimmigration_10-13.html).  
65. See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) §§ 2–6 (providing state criminal 
penalties for unlawful presence and unauthorized solicitation of work). 
66. Rubén G. Rumbaut et. al., Debunking the The Myth of Immigrant Criminality: 
Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men, MIGRATION INFORMATION 
SOURCE (Oct. 10, 2012, 12:02 PM), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/ 
display.cfm?id=403.  
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with their message of the danger posed by migrants.67 Thus, similar to the 
policy actors described by other scholars, restrictionist issue entrepreneurs 
are able to succeed and endure, despite championing empirically dubious 
claims.68 
The issue entrepreneurs’ key intuition—connecting these substantive 
misperceptions and subnational policy proliferation—is exploitation of the 
discourse of state and local rights for their particular policy ends. 
Restrictionist issue entrepreneurs are able to effectively deploy federalism 
tropes to rally local majorities and elected officials to their cause. Recent 
political science research suggests that federalism-based framing of policy 
issues by political elites are consequential to citizens’ beliefs and voting.69 
As such, the ability of restrictionist issue entrepreneurs to target willing 
elected officials, and supply those officials with federalism-based rhetoric 
to defend substantive immigration enforcement positions, measurably 
influences the failure of federal proposals.70 Even if national majorities 
favor certain aspects of federal immigration reform,71 significant 
constituencies within that diffuse majority may be convinced to oppose 
specific national reforms to preserve state involvement in enforcement 
schemes. This may be especially true after enactment of a state or local 
policy, as citizens who previously were agnostic towards restrictionist 
legislation may now support the restrictionist laws, not because of the 
substantive policy position, but to protect state and local authority.  
In addition, Carpenter notes that a few, intensely interested actors are 
sufficient to trigger a legislative epidemic, if those actors are properly 
credentialed and positioned.72 A key characteristic of this small group, she 
maintains, is the ability to recruit other credentialed and influential actors, 
like the larger group of officials, organizations, and media personalities 
listed above. Because of the opportunities presented by party polarization, 
this broader set of elected actors is easy to discover for immigration policy 
                                                                                                                            
67. Randal C. Archibold, On Border Violence, Truth Pales Compared to Ideas, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20, 2010, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/us/ 
20crime.html?pagewanted=all. 
68. Cf. Carpenter, supra note 42, at 1, 37, 56; Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 714 
(noting that the objectively weaker side may triumph by exploiting cognitive biases).  
69. Kam & Mikos, supra note 46, at 592–601. 
70. Cf. id. at 601 (noting that the federalism rhetoric of politicians is salient in influencing 
voter attitudes towards federal legislation). 
71. Scott Keeter, Where the Public Stands on Immigration Reform, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Nov. 23, 2009), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1421/where-the-public-stands-on-
immigration-reform. 
72. Carpenter, supra note 42, at 29. 
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purposes. State and local officials naturally fit into the entrepreneurial 
framework as they are key facilitators and molders of public perception.73 
With their considerable experience in channeling and mobilizing public 
opinion for electoral gains, these officials can effectively frame and 
promote the issue entrepreneurs message that demographic “facts” cause 
urgent policy problems.74 
Finally, immigration issue entrepreneurs must be appropriately 
networked, showcasing the ability—as a collective whole—to work across 
multiple jurisdictions, both among the many states and localities, and 
between federal and subfederal levels.75 Each of these actors also performs a 
specialized set of critical roles: lobbying federal legislators to block 
legislative efforts, designing model legislation for the state and local levels, 
offering legal counsel and expertise, framing and making immigration 
issues salient to the general public, mobilizing and informing issue activists, 
and keeping unseemly, race-specific immigration discourse out of 
mainstream. 
As we describe in detail below, the five issue entrepreneurs we select 
based on this framework may fill many of these roles within a networked 
system. Further, as a group, they evince the ability to fulfill the prerequisites 
for policy proliferation and legislative cascades described in the literature, 
using a unique combination of demographic “facts” and federalism rhetoric 
uniquely available in the immigration context. 
(1) Tom Tancredo played a sustained and crucial role in organizing the 
legislative opposition to bipartisan federalism solutions that included a path 
to citizenship for the unauthorized immigrant population in the United 
States. As early as 2001, he publicly countered White House attempts to 
gather support for a legalization program after the State Visit of Vicente 
Fox to Washington, D.C.76 Subsequently, Tancredo recruited new members 
into the Immigration Reform Caucus, a group that successfully prevented or 
delayed bipartisan attempts at federal immigration reform by the White 
                                                                                                                            
73. Hills, supra note 56, at 21 (“State and local politicians, however, are natural policy 
entrepreneurs who can significantly influence what sorts of conditions are publicly recognized 
as problems. . . . The entrepreneur can transform a social condition that everone has taken for 
granted into a problem that must be addressed by recategorizing the issue and offering different 
comparisons for judging whether the issue is being acceptably handled.”). 
74. Carpenter, supra note 42, at 40. 
75. Mintrom, supra note 42, at 739, 760. 
76. Newshour with Jim Lehrer, Immigration Challenge (PBS television broadcast Sept. 6, 
2001) (Representative Tancredo discussing his opposition to various aspects of then-proposed 
immigration reforms) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/congress/july-
dec01/immigration_9-6.html).  
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House and Senators Sam Brownback (R-KS) and Ted Kennedy (D-MA).77 
Tancredo’s success in blocking bipartisan legislation on immigration 
continued through the 2006 and 2007 efforts at comprehensive immigration 
reform as he rallied conservatives in the House and Senate to oppose 
provisions in the bill that would lead to an eventual path to citizenship.78 
During his time in Congress he commanded a sizable group of legislatures 
in the Immigration Reform Caucus, providing him the power to access party 
leadership and influence House votes.79 He also entered the Presidential race 
in 2007, seeking to force other candidates to address the topic of illegal 
immigration.80 
Finally, Tancredo has also been heavily involved in promoting the 
salience of immigration across various states and localities. He did so by 
introducing bills and amendments to withdraw federal funding from so-
called “sanctuary cities,”81 proposing that legislators and mayors who 
championed such legislation face criminal charges,82 urging the Department 
of Homeland not to undermine the enforcement efforts of groups such as 
the Minuteman Project,83 and lending support to legislative efforts against 
illegal immigration in states such as Pennsylvania84 and Arizona.85 
                                                                                                                            
77. See, e.g., Immigration, Reform, Accountability, and Security Enhancement Act of 
2002, S. 2444, 107th Cong. (2002). Congressman Tom Tancredo chaired the Immigration 
Reform Caucus from its creation in May of 1999 until February of 2007. About Us, 
IMMIGRATION REFORM CAUCUS, http://irc.bilbray.house.gov/about/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
78. Carl Hulse & Jim Rutenberg, Bush Faces Resistance on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 17, 2006; Lou Dobbs Tonight (Fox television broadcast June 5, 2007).  
79. M.E. Sprengelmeyer, Debate on Immigration Bill in Congress pleases Tancredo After 
Years of Pushing the Issue: Littleton Republican has Ear of GOP Leadership, DENV. ROCKY 
MTN. NEWS, Dec. 16, 2005 (“[O]n Thursday [during a House vote on Rep. Sensenbrenner’s 
employment verification bill], [Tancredo] had a direct line to Republican leadership because 
without the support of his hard-line immigration caucus, it was unlikely they could pass 
anything to appease an increasingly vocal part of the Republican base.”). 
80. Jeff Zeleny, THE 2008 CAMPAIGN: Rep. Tancredo of Colorado Enters G.O.P. 
Presidential Race, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007 (“His intention is to force other Republican 
candidates, particularly Senator John McCain of Arizona, former Gov. Mitt Romney of 
Massachusetts and former Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani of New York, to address illegal 
immigration.”). 
81. H.AMDT. 294, 110th Cong. (2007), amending H.R. 2638, 110th Cong. (2007), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HZ294:. 
82. Beverly Wang, Tancredo Targets N.H. “Sanctuary State” Bill, DENV. POST, Sept. 5, 
2007, http://www.thenewhampshireprimary.com/news/2007_09_05_news_nation1.html. 
83. H.R. Res. 839, 109th Cong. (2006). 
84. High Beam Research, Lawmakers Introduce All-Encompassing National Security 
Begins at Home Illegal Immigration Reform Package, US FED NEWS SERVICE, INCLUDING US 
STATE NEWS (Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1346939381.html.  
85. Luige del Puerto, Tancredo Forms Group Opposing Pearce Recall, ARIZ. CAPITOL 
TIMES, July 25, 2011, http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2011/07/25/tancredo-forms-group-oppos 
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(2) While Tancredo is an example of an issue entrepreneur whose 
involvement tended to a greater focus on the national level, Kris Kobach is 
an individual whose dual involvement has generally favored the state and 
local levels. Kobach’s first major involvement in immigration control was 
his authorship of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System 
(NSEERS) in his role as chief advisor to Attorney General John Ashcroft on 
immigration and border enforcement.86 However, most of his subsequent 
involvement on immigration has been at the state and local levels. As early 
as 2002, Kobach authored a memo while working at the Department of 
Justice that called for “allow[ing] local police officers to make arrests for 
civil violations of immigration law,” a move that was initially opposed by 
the White House but subsequently adopted by the Office of Legal 
Counsel.87 After moving to Kansas where he worked first as a law professor 
and then as Secretary of State, Kobach has served as legal counsel for many 
states and localities that have passed restrictive legislation, including the 
city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, whose employer and landlord sanctions are 
pending Court review;88 the city of Farmers Beach, Texas (Villas at 
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Texas)89; and the city of 
Valley Park, Missouri (Gray v. City of Valley Park, Missouri).90 Kobach is 
also providing legal counsel on constitutional challenges involving state 
legislation in Arizona and Alabama.91 
                                                                                                                            
ing-pearce-recall (stating Tancredo’s Team America PAC, whose singular focus is on 
eliminating illegal immigration to the United States, set up a fundraising committee in 2011 to 
defend Russell Pearce, Arizona State Senator and chief architect of the state’s SB1070 law); 
Gary Nelson, Pearce Basks in Adulation at Rally, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 17, 2011, 
http://www.azcentral.com/community/mesa/articles/2011/10/17/20111017russell-pearce-rally10
19.html. 
86. Kris Kobach, Resume, http://www.kssos.org/forms/administration/Kobach_Bio_ 
Resume.pdf. 
87. Eric Schmitt, Administration Split on Local Role in Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 
2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/29/us/administration-split-on-local-role-in-terror-
fight.html (“Critics are also upset that Mr. Ashcroft . . . has given . . . [Kobach] a leading role in 
developing the delicate policy even though Mr. Kobach, 36, is only a White House Fellow on 
temporary assignment to the Justice Department this year.”). A 2002 Office of Legal Counsel 
Memorandum advances the position taken by Kobach. 
88. Kent Jackson, Top Court Gives City 2nd Chance, STANDARD SPEAKER, June 7, 2011, 
http://standardspeaker.com/news/top-court-gives-city-2nd-chance-1.1158117 (noting that 
Kobach, attorney for Hazleton, was encouraged by the Supreme Court’s Whiting decision, 
arguing that it “put Hazleton on very strong ground” for remand consideration in front of the 
Third Circuit). 
89. 577 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 2008). 
90. 567 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2009). 
91. Counsel List - 567 U.S., Part 2, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
opinions/counsellists/counsellistsview.aspx?Filename=cl567-2.html. 
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Perhaps more centrally to our model of issue entrepreneurship, Kobach 
has authored much of the subnational legislation wending its way through 
the courts, with each subsequent effort expanding the scope of subnational 
participation in immigration enforcement.92 Kobach’s entrepreneurship is 
perhaps most evident in Alabama’s HB56 in 2011. As reported in the 
Mobile Press-Register:  
“Kobach got his introduction to Alabama politics in 2007, through 
a conference hosted in Birmingham by the Eagle Forum of 
Alabama, a conservative think tank. There, he met state Sen. Scott 
Beason, R-Gardendale, who said the two developed a relationship 
that centered on their shared concerns about the nation’s 
immigration policy. 
Beason, who carried the immigration bill in the Alabama Senate, 
said he leaned heavily on Kobach to help write it.
93
 
As Kobach’s entrepreneurial work in Alabama reveals, state legislation 
on immigration is not a simple matter of homegrown solutions to persistent 
and thorny local problems, as legislators often portray the issue.94 Instead, it 
often involves sponsorship and expertise from outside actors, who make 
critical choices on venues based on political opportunities (large Republican 
majorities in the legislature and a Republican governor), to build a case for 
the necessity and constitutionality of subfederal action. We will explain the 
strategic benefits of this particular method of policy proliferation in greater 
detail in Part III.B below. 
Issue entrepreneurship is not merely the handiwork of a few individuals. 
Indeed, the most intensive and sustained involvement in this issue has been 
provided by the organizations Federation for American Immigration 
Reform (FAIR) and NumbersUSA. These organizations have devoted 
considerable resources, both to defeat moderate legislation at the national 
level and promote restriction at the subnational level.95 They have large 
                                                                                                                            
92. See, for instance, the expanded scope of Alabama’s HB56 in 2011, which passed one 
year after Arizona’s SB1070. Alan Gomez, States Make Daily Life Harder for Illegal 
Immigrants, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 2011, http://usatoday.com/news/nation/story/ 
2011-12-20/illegal-immigrants-contracts-void/52132602/1.  
93. George Talbot, Kris Kobach, the Kansas Lawyer Behind Alabama’s Immigration Law, 
PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, AL), Oct. 16, 2011, available at http://blog.al.com/live/2011/ 
10/kris_kobach_the_kansas_lawyer_1.html. 
94. Indeed it is likely that a homegrown effort would have avoided post-enactment 
handwringing, and a vow by the Alabama Governor to revisit and amend the legislation to cure 
several economic and social issues it has created for the state. 
95. FAIR spent $3.44 million on lobbying between 1998 and 2011. Influence & Lobbying: 
Federation for Amer Immigration Reform, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lob 
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national memberships and can mobilize public phone and email campaigns 
to national lawmakers that produce tangible results.96 Importantly, these 
organizations bring a considerable measure of institutional investment and 
continuity that individuals like Tancredo and Kobach lack. Thus, while 
Tancredo’s leadership on the issue declined after his departure from the 
U.S. Congress, and Kobach’s centrality rose only after 2005, FAIR has been 
an enduring advocate for immigration restriction since 1979, and 
NumbersUSA has been doing so since 1997.97 Both organizations have had 
their greatest impact after 2001. 
(3) FAIR boasts a national membership of over 250,000 individuals and, 
since its founding, has advocated for sharp reductions in legal and illegal 
immigration, including “a temporary moratorium on all immigration except 
spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens and a limited number of 
refugees.”98 In its first two decades, the organization focused its advocacy 
on legislation and enforcement at the national level, but it has also 
broadened its efforts with state lobbyists and regional field offices.99 While 
the organization does not have local chapters, it works in partnership with 
other organizations, often providing legal and political expertise, as well as 
resources and personnel to local legislative campaigns.100 Indeed, as the Los 
Angeles Times reported in 1994, FAIR’s lobbyist in Sacramento, Alan 
Nelson, helped write the state’s restrictive ballot measure, Proposition 
187.101 By 2004, FAIR got much more directly involved in supporting state 
                                                                                                                            
by/clientsum.php?id=D000050827&year=2012. NumbersUSA spent $3.47 million on lobbying 
between 2001 and 2011. Influence & Lobbying: NumbersUSA.com, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000054867&year=2012. 
96. Robert Pear, Little-Known Group Claims a Win on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
2007; Nicole Gaouette, Immigration Bill Ignites A Grass-Roots Fire On The Right, L.A. TIMES, 
June 24, 2007. 
97. About FAIR, FAIRUS.ORG, http://www.fairus.org/about (last visited Nov. 10, 2012); 
About NumbersUSA, NUMBERSUSA.COM (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
98. Id. 
99. FAIR hired its current National Field Director in 2002 and supports local immigration 
reform groups in 33 states and the District of Columbia. Telephone Interview with FAIR staff 
member (Apr. 2012); see also Join a Local Immigration Reform Group, FAIRUS.ORG, 
http://www.fairus.org/action/local-group (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
100. FAIR has provided testimony, reports, briefs, and issue letters to numerous state and 
local legislative bodies. See FAIR’s Testimony and Comments, FAIRUS.ORG, 
http://www.fairus.org/legislation/testimony (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). One early example of 
assistance on state-level efforts was in litigation over Proposition 200 in Arizona in 2004. See 
Proposition 200 Should be Implemented as the Voters Intended: Illegal Immigrants Must be 
Barred from Receiving All Nonemergency Benefits, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 19, 2004. 
101. Paul Feldman, Group’s Funding of Immigration Measure Assailed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 
10, 1994, http://articles.latimes.com/1994-09-10/local/me-36690_1_pioneer-fund (“When 
former federal immigration chief Nelson helped write the initiative last year, he was a 
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legislative efforts: it financially-backed Arizona’s Proposition 200 
campaign, a measure modeled after Proposition 187 that sought to deny 
unauthorized immigrants access to many public benefits;102 it subsequently 
filed a lawsuit in Arizona to make sure that the benefit provisions would be 
interpreted broadly.103 
Since 2004, FAIR has institutionalized its legal support of state and local 
ordinances through its legal affiliate, the Immigration Reform Law Institute 
(IRLI).104 This group, with Michael Hethmon and Kris Kobach as lead 
advisors, offers legal counsel and model legislation to states and localities 
contemplating restrictive action and challenges state and local laws when 
they expand the rights of unauthorized immigrant residents in cases such as 
the California provision allowing in-state college tuition for unauthorized 
immigrants who graduate from the state’s high schools105 and San 
Francisco’s issuance of municipal identification cards.106 
(4) Along with FAIR (and its legal arm, IRLI), NumbersUSA is the other 
major organizational force in immigration politics, fulfilling the vital role of 
derailing attempts at national, comprehensive immigration legislation 
through its work with specific legislators. The national organization was 
founded in 1997 by Roy Beck, advocate for immigration reduction and 
author of a best-selling book on the topic in 1996.107 Critical to the group’s 
founding was Dr. John Tanton, a one-time environmentalist turned 
                                                                                                                            
Sacramento lobbyist for the Federation for American Immigration Reform, a national 
organization that advocates sealing the nation’s borders and reducing immigration.”). Note, 
however, that the ballot sponsors denied that the organization was directly involved. 
102. Steven Wall, Efforts Against Illegal Immigrants Rise, SAN BERNARDINO SUN, Nov. 9, 
2004. 
103. At the trial court, Yes on Proposition 200 v. Napolitano, CV2004-092999 (Ariz. Sup. 
Ct. 2004), Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed. However, on appeal the Arizona Court of Appeals 
reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action against the Governor and 
allowed Plaintiffs leave to file second amended complaint. Yes on Prop 200 v. Napolitano, 215 
Ariz. 458, 472 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); see also Suit Filed Over AG’s Opinion On Public Benefits 
Under Prop 200, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 19, 2004. 
104. “The Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI) is FAIR’s affiliated legal organization. 
. . . IRLI works extensively with state and local governments to design legislation that 
effectively addresses problems resulting from illegal immigration.” The Immigration Reform 
Law Institute, FAIRUS.ORG, http://www.fairus.org/Default.aspx?PageID=12564537. 
105. The Immigration Reform Law Institute appealed the case of Martinez v. Regents of the 
University of California, 241 P.3d 855 (2010), to the U.S. Supreme Court, where certiorari was 
denied, 131 S.Ct. 2961 (2011); see also Savage, supra note 60. 
106. Coté, supra note 60. 
107. See Roy Beck, THE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION (1996) (arguing that immigration 
adversely affects the U.S. labor market, the environment, and local community systems); About 
Us: Early History, NUMBERSUSA, http://www.numbersusa.com/content/learn/about/roy-beck-
executive-director.html. 
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immigration crusader who spawned a number of prominent organizations 
like FAIR, NumbersUSA, and the Center for Immigration Studies.108 
Groups such as the Southern Poverty Law Center have long contended that 
Tanton’s network is a multipronged effort at mobilizing racial antipathy 
towards Latinos,109 and recently archived correspondence from Tanton at 
the University of Michigan indicate that he often invoked race and the 
threat of Mexican immigration to white racial dominance.
110
 
As worries over Dr. Tanton’s explicitly white nationalistic rhetoric 
grew,
111
 Beck attempted to distance NumbersUSA from Tanton by 2002. 
However, reports show continued contact and relationship between 
NumbersUSA and other organizations directed by Tanton, and arms-length 
coordination on state legislative efforts between more mainstream groups 
and racial hate groups.112 This ostensible distancing helps NumbersUSA 
serve its specific role in the entrepreneurial landscape. The organization 
provides the critical legitimating mechanism for the restrictionists in 
immigration discourse, channeling the racial and ethnic hostility of many of 
its supporters into race-neutral, policy positions palatable to national 
lawmakers.113 
Although NumbersUSA had only 4,000 members in 2001,114 it swelled to 
nearly 500,000 members by mid-2007, as bipartisan comprehensive 
                                                                                                                            
108. Jason Deparle, The Anti-Immigration Crusader, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/us/17immig.html?pagewanted=all. 
109. John Tanton is the Mastermind Behind the Organized Anti-Immigration Movement, S. 
POVERTY LAW CTR. INTELLIGENCE REPORT: THE PUPPETEER, Vol. 106 (Summer 2002) (“The 
organized anti-immigration ‘movement,’ increasingly in bed with racist hate groups, is 
dominated by one man, John Tanton.”); see also INS and the Executive Office For Immigration 
Review: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 30–38 (2001) (statement of Roy Beck, Executive Director, 
NumbersUSA).  
110. Deparle, supra note 108 (“‘One of my prime concerns,’ [John Tanton] wrote to a large 
donor, ‘is about the decline of folks who look like you and me.’ He warned a friend that ‘for 
European-American society and culture to persist requires a European-American majority, and a 
clear one at that.’”). 
111. Pear, supra note 96. 
112. Leonard Zeskind, The New Nativism, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Oct. 23, 2005, 
http://prospect.org/article/new-nativism. 
113. Pear, supra note 96 (quoting Frank Sharry, executive director of the national 
Immigration Forum as stating “Roy Beck takes people who are upset about illegal immigration 
for different reasons, including hostility to Latino immigrants, and disciplines them so their 
message is based on policy rather than race-based arguments or xenophobia”). 
114. Mallie Jane Kim, After 9/11, Immigration Became About Homeland Security, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 8, 2011. 
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immigration reform efforts looked increasingly likely.115 Beck credited the 
growth in membership to a few primary factors, including the events of 9/11 
and the immigration stance of President Bush.116 The organization works to 
stall moderate bipartisan efforts on immigration issues, even when those 
proposals comport with national majoritarian preferences.  
Indeed, NumbersUSA’s work was critical to derailing the 2007 
comprehensive federal immigration bill, which had, at that point, received 
the support of President Bush, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the high-
tech industry, the Catholic Church, immigrant-advocacy organizations, and 
several industries reliant on immigrant labor, including farming, food 
services, and construction.117 During the weeks leading up to the floor vote 
on the bill, NumbersUSA coordinated weekly phone calls with the 
Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus, mobilized its members to 
engage key senators, and provided those senators with the information and 
arguments necessary to oppose the bill.118 Several actors, including pro-
immigrant advocates, restrictionists, and members of Congress, have 
credited NumbersUSA with causing the collapse of the bill in the Senate.119 
(5) Finally, media actors have played a significant role in facilitating the 
work of issue entrepreneurs on immigration restriction at the national and 
subnational levels. Indeed, one media personality in particular, Lou Dobbs, 
played such a key role in both levels that he merits the designation as an 
issue entrepreneur. Lou Dobbs Tonight on CNN promoted the cause of 
immigration restriction in several ways: (1) providing sustained attention to 
national and subnational manifestations between 2003 and 2009, (2) raising 
the issue’s salience among activists and non-activists alike, (3) providing a 
platform for restrictionists to express their views with little critical analysis 
or challenge, and (4) occasionally making fundraising appeals for the legal 
defense of subnational legislation. 
Immigration was Dobbs’ signature issue from the very founding of Lou 
Dobbs Tonight in June 2003. In the inaugural year of the show, Dobbs 
covered the topic of illegal immigration in 151 of 257 shows (59%).120 
During this time, he devoted about as much time to his other signature 
topic: outsourcing, an issue championed more by Democrats than 
                                                                                                                            
115. Id.; Krissah Williams, Labor Groups, Business Seek Immigration Law Overhaul, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2007. 
116. Gaouette, supra note 96. 
117. Pear, supra note 96. 
118. Id. 
119. Gaouette, supra note 96. 
120. The show was dubbed Lou Dobbs Tonight starting on June 9, 2003. We treat the 
inaugural year as June 9, 2003 to June 8, 2004. 
  
 
 
 
1462 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
Republicans (160 shows).121 Since then, however, immigration reigned 
supreme in his program, as he covered the topic in 1,189 of 1,413 shows 
(84%), while the issue of outsourcing dipped to 565 (or 49%).122 Little 
surprise, then, that a Media Matters Report noted in 2008 that, “instead of 
Lou Dobbs Tonight, his program might be more properly called Lou Dobbs 
Crusades Against Illegal Immigration Tonight.”123 
His coverage of illegal immigration focused both on national legislation 
and personalities such as Jim Sensenbrenner, who introduced legislation in 
2005 that would make illegal immigration and assisting illegal immigrants a 
felony, but also on local groups like the Minuteman Project, which recruited 
volunteers to patrol the U.S.–Mexico border.124 Dobbs also provided a 
national platform for Hazleton, Pennsylvania and its then-mayor Lou 
Barletta, including devoting an entire show to a town hall meeting on 
immigration hosted by the city.125 
Dobbs also often took on the role of an advocate, even going so far as 
making fundraising appeals for the city’s attempts to defend itself against 
legal challenges by the ACLU and MALDEF.126 The extent of Dobbs’ 
advocacy on subnational policy was perhaps most evident in the case of 
Governor Eliot Spitzer’s decision to make driver licenses available to 
unauthorized immigrants in New York in 2007.127 He devoted over thirty 
shows to the topic, criticizing Spitzer’s proposal, inviting his guests to do 
the same, and mobilizing public opposition.128 The level of mobilization was 
                                                                                                                            
121. Lou Dobbs Tonight Transcripts, CNN.COM, http://transcripts.cnn.com/ 
TRANSCRIPTS/ldt.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
122. Id. 
123. Paul Waldman et al., Fear & Loathing in Prime Time: Immigration Myths and Cable 
News, MEDIA MATTERS (May 21, 2008), http://mediamattersaction.org/reports/fearand 
loathing/online_version. 
124. From 2004 to 2006, Sensenbrenner was covered in 119 shows, and the Minutemen 
were covered in 129 shows. 
125. Lou Dobbs Tonight (Fox television broadcast May 2, 2007), available at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0705/02/ldt.02.html. 
126. Lou Dobbs Tonight, (Fox television broadcast May 4, 2007), available at 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0705/04/ldt.01.html (urging viewers to donate funds 
to subsidize Hazelton’s legal defense of its immigration ordinance). 
127. Nicholas Confessore, Lou Dobbs Crusades Against Spitzer’s Driver’s License Plan for 
Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 
10/17/nyregion/17dobbs.html. 
128. Dobbs called the proposal “outrageous” on his October 29th, 2007 show. Press 
Release, N.Y. State Senator John J. Flanagon, Senator Flanagon Appears on CNN’s Lou Dobbs 
Tonight to Discuss Spitzer’s Licensing Policy (Oct. 29, 2007), available at 
http://www.nysenate.gov/news/senator-flanagan-appears-cnn-s-lou-dobbs-tonight-discuss-spitze 
r-s-licensing-policy (includes a transcript of the show). 
  
 
 
 
44:1431] THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLITICAL 1463 
intense and sustained and was largely credited in forcing Spitzer to drop his 
proposal, who declared, “It does not take a stethoscope to hear the pulse of 
New Yorkers on this topic.”129  
2. Issue Entrepreneurs in Context 
These issue entrepreneurs are notable in our Polarized Change model for 
the multifarious work that they have done: they have engaged in both 
federal and subfederal levels, sharpening prior conditions of party 
polarization and shaping the rise of ethnic nationalism—all to advance a 
restrictionist agenda that has depended both on preventing bipartisan, 
moderate legislation at the national level and proliferating restrictive 
legislation at the subnational level. Here, we provide illustrations of this 
process from each of the last three presidential terms. 
Bush First Term (2001 to 2004): The scholarship on partisanship has 
noted a marked increase in polarization since 2000, after a protracted and 
contentious debate over the legitimacy of the Presidential election and sharp 
disagreements over tax cuts in 2001 and the prosecution of the Iraq war in 
2003.130 Despite the general rise in party polarization, it was not inevitable 
that legislative attempts on immigration policy since 2000 would divide 
sharply along party lines and fail to pass the U.S. Congress. Indeed, Bush 
was able to centralize in several areas of domestic policy that his own party 
had, for many years, left to states.131 For instance, the No Child Left Behind 
Act passed by overwhelming majorities in the House and Senate in 2001,132 
and even contentious measures such as the 2001 tax cuts and the 2002 Iraq 
                                                                                                                            
129. Erika Hayasaki, Driver’s License Plan Dropped, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/15/nation/na-spitzer15. 
130. GARY C. JACOBSON, A DIVIDER, NOT A UNITER: GEORGE W. BUSH AND THE AMERICAN 
PEOPLE: THE 2006 ELECTION AND BEYOND 1–3 (2009); Alan I. Abramowitz & Walter J. Stone, 
The Bush Effect: Polarization, Turnout, and Activism in the 2004 Presidential Election, 36 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 141 (2006); Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams, Political 
Polarization in the American Public, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 563 (2008); Geoffrey C. Layman, 
Thomas M. Carsey & Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Party Polarization in American Politics: 
Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences, 9 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 83 (2006).  
131. Dale Krane, The Middle Tier in American Federalism: State Government Policy 
Activism During the Bush Presidency, 37 PUBLIUS (ISSUE 3), 453, 453–54 (2007).  
132. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, H.R. 1, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted) (passed in 
the House 384–45 and Senate 91–8); see Bill Overview, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h107-1 (summary of congressional voting for No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2001).  
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War Resolution managed to draw enough bipartisan support to reach the 
President.133  
In the immigration context specifically, prior votes on landmark 
legislation also garnered sufficient bipartisan support to pass: the 1986 
Immigration Reform and Control Act won nearly 43% of Republican 
support in the U.S. House in addition to 65% of Democrat support in the 
chamber.134 Similarly, in 1996, 94% of Democrats joined 100% of 
Republicans in the U.S. Senate in favor of the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act.135  
With the strong backing of President Bush and Senators such as Sam 
Brownback (R-KS) and Ted Kennedy (D-MA), it seemed that immigration 
reform might once again pass the U.S. Congress after 2000.136 Immigration 
reform was high on the Bush administration’s legislative agenda in the 
summer of 2001.137 Having passed a contentious and ambitious ten-year tax 
reduction plan, the administration was gearing up to work on a way to 
regularize the flow of migrants from Mexico and provide a path to 
legalization for those already residing in the United States.138 The 
administration was especially eager to show progress on this issue in 
advance of the State visit of President Vicente Fox, a personal friend of the 
                                                                                                                            
133. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.R.J. Res. 
114, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted) (passed in the House 296–133 and Senate 77–23); Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, H.R. 1836, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted) 
(passed in the House 230–197 and Senate 62–38); see Resolution Overview, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hj107-114 (summary of congressional voting for 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002); Bill Overview, 
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h107-1836 (summary of 
congressional voting for Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001).  
134. See House Vote #872 in 1986, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
vote.xpd?vote=h1986-872 (last visited Oct. 23, 2012). 
135. See Senate Vote #108 in 1996, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
vote.xpd?vote=s1996-108 (last visited Oct. 23, 2012). 
136. See Marc Cooper, High Noon on the Border, THE NATION, June 6, 2005, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/high-noon-border; Kristen Lombardi, Out in the Cold, 
BOSTON PHOENIX, Aug. 15–22, 2002, available at http://www.bostonphoenix.com/ 
boston/news_features/other_stories/multipage/documents/02425201.htm. 
137. See Cooper, supra note 136. 
138. Bob Kemper, U.S.-Mexico Immigration Plan Delayed, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2001), 
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-09-01/news/0109010148_1_bush-and-fox-
president-bush-first-state-dinner; Eric Schmitt, Bush Aides Weigh Legalizing Status of Mexicans 
in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2001), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/15/us/bush-
aides-weigh-legalizing-status-of-mexicans-in-us.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
  
 
 
 
44:1431] THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLITICAL 1465 
President, in early September.139 Even though the September 11 attacks 
delayed any attempt at comprehensive immigration reform, a bipartisan 
group of legislators still tried to pass smaller measures. 
One such attempt was in 2002, as legislative leaders in Congress tried to 
amend a seemingly obscure provision extending the grandfather period 
during which eligible undocumented immigrants could apply for legal 
permanent residency without leaving the United States.140 Tancredo 
mounted a vigorous opposition, claiming that the bill would “invite future 
terrorists to exploit lax enforcement of the immigration laws.”141 He 
succeeded in pushing for a two-thirds supermajority rule on the legislation; 
FAIR lobbied wavering legislators, and NumbersUSA mobilized its grass-
roots supporters to maximize Republican opposition to the measure in 
Congress.142 The resistance emboldened opposition in the U.S. Senate where 
it subsequently stalled.143 Thus, even though the amendment had the 
backing of the Bush administration, the insurgent activities of issue 
entrepreneurs derailed bipartisan attempts to allow for limited adjustment of 
status by pushing many moderate Republicans into the restrictionist 
camp.144 
                                                                                                                            
139. Eric Schmitt, Two Amigos Visit Toledo and Court its Mexicans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2001, https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/07/world/two-amigos-visit-toledo-and-court-its-
mexicans.html?src=pm.  
140. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, H. Res. 365, 107th 
Cong. (2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:H.RES.365: 
(proposing changes to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), regarding Adjustment of Status). 
141. Section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act passed in 1994, and was 
renewed in 1997 and 2000. The Bush administration pushed vigorously for the measure with the 
hope of having a signed bill prior to the President’s visit to Mexico in March 2002. The 
Democrats hoped to make the extension permanent. However, Congressman Tancredo used 
various legislative maneuvers to force a two-thirds requirement that passed with one vote. See 
Robert Pear, House Passes Immigrant Bill To Aid Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002. 
142. DeParle, supra note 108 (“Numbers USA showed its force in 2002 when Republican 
leaders of the House backed a bill that would have allowed some illegal immigrants to remain in 
the United States while seeking legal status. Numbers USA set the phones on fire, and a 
majority of Republicans opposed it. ‘I had people come up to me on the floor of the House 
saying, ‘O.K., O.K., call off the dogs’—meaning Numbers USA,’ said former Representative 
Tom Tancredo, a Colorado Republican who fought the bill.”). 
143. See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, H.R. 365, 107th 
Cong. (2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:H.RES.365:; 
ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,IMMIGRATION: ADJUSTMENT TO PERMANENT 
RESIDENT STATUS UNDER SECTION 245(I) (2003), available at 
http://congressionalresearch.com/RL31373/document.php?study=Immigration+Adjustment+to+
Permanent+Resident+Status+Under+Section+245i. 
144. M.E. Sprengelmeyer, Debate on Immigration Bill in Congress Pleases Tancredo After 
Years of Pushing the Issue: Littleton Republican has Ear of GOP Leadership, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Dec. 16, 2005, http://m.rockymountainnews.com/news/ 
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Accordingly, our theory emphasizes that national legislative gridlock on 
immigration matters is specifically influenced by party polarization, not just 
heterogeneity and interest diffusion as it may be in other regulatory areas.145 
Undoubtedly, such heterogeneity and diffusion exists in immigration law as 
well; those clamoring for federal immigration laws are sometimes a strange 
amalgam of interests, from immigrants’ advocacy groups to private 
business interests, who either need a labor source or are trying to avoid 
state-by-state regulations.146 And, the platform for national legislation is 
broad, ranging from providing pathways to legalization to creating uniform 
employment regulations to reconsidering admissions limitations and 
enforcement priorities.147  
These disparate groups have demonstrated the capacity to coalesce over 
the past decade to advance federal immigration reforms.148 Many of these 
proposals enjoyed the support of national majorities and bipartisan 
                                                                                                                            
2005/dec/16/debate-on-immigration-bill-in-congress-pleases/ (noting the necessity of GOP 
leadership taking heed of hard-line restrictionists because of the voting power of Tancredo’s 
immigration caucus).  
145. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 56, at 12 (“The problem [of creating national gridlock] is 
not that interest groups do not represent diffuse ideological interests. Rather, the problem is that 
nothing unifies these interests into coalitions capable of making policy.”). To be clear, Hills 
expressly excluded immigration from his consideration, focusing instead on other regulatory 
areas. Id. at 8. Our comments are orthogonal to his—not oppositional. We use this opportunity 
to showcase how some of the important considerations and theories one might defend with 
regards to federal legislative generally, may not neatly apply in the immigration context. 
146. See Victoria DeFrancesco Soto, Strange Bedfellows in Arizona’s Recall of Russell 
Pearce, DAILY GRITO, July 21, 2011, http://drvmds.com/2011/07/strange-bedfellows-in-
arizona%E2%80%99s-recall-of-russell-pearce/ (discussing coalition of Chamber of Commerce, 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Latinos in opposition to SB 1070 and 
supporting recall of State Senator Russell Pearce). 
147. See, e.g., 2012 Democratic Platform, available at http://assets.dstatic.org/dnc-
platform/2012-National-Platform.pdf (last accessed Sept. 14, 2012) (lauding President Obama 
for securing the Mexican-American Border, streamlining the process of immigration for 
relatives of citizens, for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, and enhancing 
immigrant integration); 2012 Republican Platform, available at http://www.gop.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/2012GOPPlatform.pdf (last accessed Sept. 14, 2012) (promoting the 
granting of visas to highly-skilled immigrants, state-control in voter ID laws and immigration, 
the mandatory use of e-verify, immigrant participation in the Armed Forces, and opposing 
amnesty for illegal immigrants). 
148. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, S. 735, 104th Cong. 
(1996), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:SN00735:@@@R; Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, H.R. 3734, 104th Cong. 
(1996), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:HR03734:@@@R; Ankush 
Agarwal, Comment, Obstructing Justice: The Rise and Fall of the AEDPA, 41 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 839, 850 (2004); Daniel J. Tichenor, Strange Bedfellows: The Politics and Pathologies of 
Immigration Reform, 5 LAB. 39, 60 (2008).  
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congressional support.149 So, despite the frailities described above, pro-
immigrant (or anti-regulation/enforcement) forces are capable of joining 
together for sufficient periods of time to place legislation on the national 
agenda, and force floor debates and votes. Yet, because it is much easier to 
defeat federal legislation than to shepherd it to passage,150 focused minority 
interests represented by restrictionist issue entrepreneurs have been able to 
defeat those clamoring for national immigration legislation.151 National 
proposals moderate and compromise the restrictionist agenda in significant 
ways, and the federal legislature provides far less opportunities for 
envelope-pushing, productive entrepreneurial activity than do subfederal 
forums.152 
Thus, the Polarized Change model helps explain why, in the immigration 
field, congressional gridlock may be even more difficult to overcome than 
in other regulatory areas.153 While subject to some of the same concerns 
about heterogeneity of interests and the difficulty of maintaining coalitions, 
it also features activists and insiders, like Tancredo, capable of polarizing 
immigration politics and stagnating federal reform, even when majority 
interests coalesce.  
In addition to exacerbating party polarization, issue entrepreneurs also 
took advantage of the rhetorical opportunities offered by the September 11 
attacks, which birthed a new form of ethnic nationalism. The post-9/11 
version of ethnic nationalism championed by issue entrepreneurs moved 
beyond the “culture threat” concerns articulated famously in 1991 by 
conservative commentator and then-Republican presidential candidate Pat 
Buchanan.154 Although the fear of cultural balkanization was still prominent 
                                                                                                                            
149. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, S. 735, 104th Cong. 
(1996), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:SN00735:@@@R; Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, H.R. 3734, 104th Cong. 
(1996), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:HR03734:@@@R. 
150. Hills, supra note 56, at 12–13 (citing KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY 
OF U.S. LAWMAKING 20–48 (1998) (“[B]ecause enacting federal laws requires supermajorities to 
overcome presidential vetoes or senatorial filibusters, a group of interests far smaller than a 
majority can block legislation.”).  
151. Deparle, supra note 108; Shannon Oxley, Federation for American Immigration 
Reform, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IMMIGRATION (Nov. 28, 2011), http://immigration-online.org/492-
federation-for-american-immigration-reform.html.   
152. Hills, supra note 56, at 21 (“[I]ncumbent members of Congress may also regard 
political entrepreneurship as too risky, given the specialized communities that it might offend 
and the benefits of . . . cultivating the personal vote.”). 
153. Id. Note that Professor Hills specifically writes outside the context of immigration law, 
so our suggestions do not necessarily contradict his. 
154. Clarence Page, And, Now, The Pat And David Show, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 1991 (“[I]f 
we had to take a million immigrants in, say Zulus, next year, or Englishmen, and put them in 
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among immigration restrictionists after 9/11,155 the attacks introduced a new 
dimension of national security to the public discourse on immigration 
restriction. 
With national security considerations adding a level of legitimacy and 
plausible deniability to the role of racial antipathy in nativist sentiment, 
issue entrepreneurs made sure to invoke this dimension frequently in their 
opposition to immigration. They frequently lumped illegal immigrants 
together with terrorists in discussions ranging from the U.S.–Mexico border 
crossing156 to the attempt by states to grant drivers licenses to unauthorized 
immigrants.157 Indeed, as Professor Jennifer Chacon has noted, the term 
“border security” emerged only after 9/11, as prior discussions of “border 
control” took on military metaphors and subsumed concerns about 
homeland security and terrorism.158 The conflation of terrorism and illegal 
immigration, in turn, had a chilling effect on legislative attempts at the 
national or subnational levels that were perceived as being “soft” on illegal 
immigrants. As James Carafano, a homeland security expert at the 
conservative Heritage Foundation noted: “the connection between 
immigration and terrorism in policy discussions did make it more difficult 
to have a rational debate with some people, who could just throw in 
terrorism and halt the conversation.”159 
                                                                                                                            
Virginia, what group would be easier to assimilate and would cause less problems for the people 
of Virginia?”). 
155. See Samuel Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar./Apr. 2004, 
30 (“The persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatens to divide the United States into two 
peoples, two cultures, and two languages.”). 
156. See J.D. HAYWORTH WITH JOSEPH J. EULE, WHATEVER IT TAKES: ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2006). [BB R 15] 
157. CNN’s Lou Dobbs Tonight frequently made the linkages between state drivers licenses 
to illegal immigrants and terrorist threats to homeland security. See, e.g., Lou Dobbs Tonight 
(CNN television broadcast Oct 17, 2007), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0710/ 
17/ldt.01.html (“The governor . . . will make it easier for law breakers of all sorts—including 
terrorists—to take advantage of New York State's driver's license . . . .”). 
158. Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control 
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1853 (2007) (“[R]emovals of noncitizens . . . 
can be, and frequently are, depicted as national security policy. With regard to border 
enforcement efforts, the phrase ‘border security’ has become a ubiquitous descriptive term . . . 
.”). 
159. Mallie Jane Kim, After 9/11, Immigration Became About Homeland Security, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 27, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/09/08/after-
911-immigration-became-about-homeland-security-attacks-shifted-the-conversation-heavily-
toward-terrorism-and-enforcement; cf. Linda Bosniak, ‘Nativism’ the Concept: Some 
Reflections, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! 279 (Juan Perea ed., 1996) (arguing that the word “nativism” 
is not as important for what it means as what it does; that is, it delegitimizes points of view and 
takes them out of the bounds of rational debate). 
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This invocation of security tropes, combined with an almost exclusive 
focus on unwanted migration from the southern border, situates the 
proliferation of subnational immigration regulation within the historical 
narrative of the past decade, showing how 9/11 changed the discourse of 
immigration, providing issue entrepreneurs with the necessary language to 
covertly indulge the racial and cultural prejudices of a portion of the 
citizenry. Further, it showcases the precise mechanism by which nebulous 
racial and cultural concerns can be exploited within political factions to 
produce immigration policy. 
Scholars like Michael Wishnie have long maintained that devolved 
immigration decision-making will lead to increased bigotry.160 Recent 
findings by the Department of Justice regarding local immigration 
enforcement in Arizona support his contention.161 Racial profiling and 
disparate enforcement seem to inevitably result when states and localities 
attempt to enforce immigration (although, one might worry about the racial 
disparity in immigration enforcement generally, regardless of whether 
federal or subfederal entities engage in it162). Missing from these important 
explorations of the effects of subnational immigration regulation is an 
account of how ethnic nationalism and racial prejudice work to produce 
state and local regulation in the first instance.  
To fill that void, the Polarized Change model shows how restrictionist 
issue entrepreneurs effectively take advantage of latent racial prejudice to 
build party and local majority support for immigration legislation. Through 
the prism of national security and homeland sanctity, entrepreneurs have 
successfully moved explicit racial and cultural reasons for restriction from 
the fringe of political discussion to the mainstream. The racialized 
component of homeland security discourse is evidenced by the focus on 
                                                                                                                            
160. Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, 
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 553 (2001) (arguing that devolution 
of immigrant-related lawmaking power to the states would “erode the antidiscrimination and 
anticaste principles that are at the heart of our Constitution”). 
161. Letter Memorandum from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gen., to Mr. Bill 
Montgomery, Cnty. Attorney for Maricopa Cnty., Ariz. (Dec. 15, 2011) (discussing the United 
States’ Investigation of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office: “[b]ased upon our extensive 
investigation, we find reasonable cause to believe that [the sheriff’s office] engages in a pattern 
or practice of unconstitutional policing. Specifically, we find that [the sheriff’s office] . . . 
engages in racial profiling of Latinos; unlawfully stops, detains, and arrests Latinos”). 
162. Federal law maintained racial barriers to naturalization, excluded based on national 
and racial origin, and recently called for special registration of certain middle-eastern migrants 
through its NSEERS program—a program architected, in part, by Kris Kobach, one of the 
immigration issue entrepreneurs we identify, during his stint with the Department of Justice. See 
generally Huntington, supra note 9.  
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Mexican migrants and the southern border and the use of explicitly 
racialized rhetoric to drum up support for restrictionist policies. In sum, the 
Polarized Change model incorporates and explains the role of ethnic 
nationalism and racial prejudice in the genesis—and not just the result—of 
subnational immigration law.  
Finally, from 2001 through 2004, issue entrepreneurs were working at 
both federal and subfederal levels. Even before state legislative efforts at 
immigration restriction were making national headlines in 2006, groups 
such as FAIR were getting involved in subnational efforts to restrict 
immigration. For example, during the summer of 2001, the organization 
played a supportive role in advising local activists in Iowa who were 
mobilizing against Governor Tom Vilsack’s Model Cities program to create 
“immigration enterprise zones” to address the state’s chronic labor 
shortages.163 Also, as we noted in the prior section, FAIR gathered 
signatures for Arizona’s restrictionist Proposition 200 in 2004 and filed 
lawsuits after the measure’s passage to ensure its broadest application.164 
Bush Second Term (2005 to 2008): Soon after the 2004 election, the 
Bush administration again made comprehensive immigration reform a 
policy priority, encouraging renewed efforts at bipartisan legislation.165 At 
the same time, the President’s standing within the Republican Party was 
diminished considerably. Not only was Bush a lame-duck party leader 
whose Vice-President had forsworn any plans to run in 2008, he also lost 
considerable standing among conservative activists who were frustrated 
with the administration’s failure to rein in government spending166 and its 
inability to privatize aspects of Social Security in early 2005.167 
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164. See, e.g., Yes on Proposition 200 v. Napolitano, 215 Ariz. 458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
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Thus, issue entrepreneurs such as Tom Tancredo (R-CO) and 
NumbersUSA found it much easier to mobilize Republican Party activists 
and elected officials towards a more restrictive position. Making effective 
use of conservative talk radio and constituent pressure, they thinned the 
ranks of Republican moderates on immigration, making the parties more 
polarized on the issue than they would have been otherwise.168 This was 
perhaps most evident in the case of Jim Sensenbrenner’s (R-WI), who 
spearheaded an enforcement-only measure in 2005, although he previously 
supported legislation such as the § 245(i) provision Tancredo opposed in 
2001 and 2002.169  
The exacerbation of party polarization by issue entrepreneurs continued 
through 2007, when Comprehensive Immigration Reform legislation had 
majority support in both chambers of Congress, but failed to overcome the 
Senate filibuster, as restrictionist organizations put enormous pressure on 
moderate Republicans to prevent cloture. As the New York Times reported: 
The big war broke out in 2007, after Mr. Bush proposed a 
systemic overhaul including a path to citizenship for most illegal 
immigrants . . . . 
FAIR rallied talk show hosts. The Center for Immigration Studies 
churned out studies of the bill’s perceived flaws. Numbers USA 
jammed the Capitol’s phones. 
Their success became the stuff of lore. They “lit up the 
switchboard for weeks,” said Senator Mitch McConnell of 
Kentucky, the Republican leader, explaining his decision to 
oppose the bill. “And to every one of them, I say today: ‘Your 
voice was heard.’ ”170 
This covert and overt multilevel work in derailing federal immigration 
law has largely gone unexamined because restrictionist issue entrepreneurs 
do not concurrently advance an alternate comprehensive, legislative 
                                                                                                                            
168. Interview with Angela Kelley, Former Deputy Dir. of the Nat’l Immigration Forum 
(Feb. 2011) (notes on file with author). 
169. Press Release, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
Rep. Gekas Introduces Compromise Immigration 245(i) Extension Legislation; Sensenbrenner 
Supports Expedited House Consideration Next Week (May 17, 2001) (Sensenbrenner called 
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170. Deparle, supra note 108. 
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solution.171 Indeed, groups such as FAIR consider “comprehensive 
immigration reform” simply a code for amnesty and see maximal 
enforcement as the only acceptable solution.172 Thus, restrictionist issue 
entrepreneurs are focused mainly on forestalling bipartisan Congressional 
action that would moderate hard-line restrictionist goals. Relatedly, they do 
not attract the attention that a special interest group garners when it seeks 
concentrated fiscal gains or private benefits.173 Because they work at 
multiple levels, they can utilize congressional delay to build subnational 
momentum towards a more restrictionist national stance.174 Moreover, issue 
entrepreneurs have been successful in securing federal concessions through 
quieter avenues than congressional legislation.175 Thus, even in the absence 
of federal legislative solutions that could preempt their subfederal policies 
and increase public scrutiny, issue entrepreneurs have been able to secure 
favorable federal action in an enforcement-only direction. 
Under these background conditions, restrictionist issue entrepreneurs 
instead (a) engender federal legislative gridlock, (b) squeeze substantial 
political mileage out of complaining about that specific type of federal 
inaction, and then (c) fill that legislative vacuum by proliferating subfederal 
immigration laws that feature uncompromised versions of their restrictionist 
agenda. The Supreme Court, in Chy Lung v. Freeman,176 gestured that 
                                                                                                                            
171. We note, however, that there have been some federal legislative efforts championed by 
issue entrepreneurs. Some, like the Secure Fences Act of 2006, were successful. Others, like the 
CLEAR Act were not. 
172. Federation for American Immigration Reform, The Push for Amnesty for Illegal Aliens 
(2010), available at http://www.fairus.org/issue/the-push-for-amnesty-for-illegal-aliens. (“[O]f 
the three legs of the stool [enforcement, improved legal flows, path to legalization], only one leg 
— law enforcement — makes sense and has broad public support.”).  
173. See Hills, supra note 56, at 10–11 (citing Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 342 (1990) (describing holdups to federal legislation, including 
“Madison’s Nightmare” of majority inaction enabling minority dominance and problems of 
collective action)). 
174. See Press Release, Mitt Romney, Mitt Romney Announces Support of Kansas 
Secretary of State Kris Kobach (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
index.php?pid=99028. In its current and recent versions, comprehensive federal immigration 
reform proposals feature items anathema to the restrictionist vision, like the DREAM Act and 
increased legal immigration. Federation for American Immigration Reform, FAIR Applauds 
Senate Defeat of the “Recurring” DREAM Act Amnesty, PRNEWSWIRE (Oct. 24, 2007), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/fair-applauds-senate-defeat-of-the-recurring-dream-
act-amnesty-58904982.html. 
175. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing Obama Administration’s enforcement heavy 
concessions). 
176. 92 U.S. 275 (1875). 
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federal inaction builds the necessary constitutional narrative177 for 
subfederal involvement in immigration. Issue entrepreneurs limit the idea of 
“federal inaction” to recent congressional inaction,178 and they use this 
frame to instantiate their policy goals at the local and state levels and build 
momentum towards a new legal and political norm for immigration 
enforcement.  
With respect to ethnic nationalism, issue entrepreneurs such as Lou 
Dobbs tried different ways to cast Latin American immigrants as a security 
threat.179 With concerns over terrorist threats becoming less salient over 
time, and economic anxiety not yet on the horizon, aspects of immigrant 
criminality suddenly seemed very salient. Thus, for instance, elected 
representatives such as Lou Barletta from Hazleton and Russell Pearce from 
Arizona justified their restrictionist efforts by claiming a rise in violent 
crime among Mexican immigrant residents and the possibility of 
clandestine cross-border arms networks.180 Law enforcement officials such 
as Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio affirmed such claims.181 Finally, media 
personalities such as Lou Dobbs amplified the anxiety by running stories on 
immigrants and crime, suggesting that gangs of illegal immigrants from 
Latin America were prompting a rash of new crimes in the country.182  
These claims mostly did not stand up to empirical scrutiny: while the 
isolated stories about particular crimes involving Latin American 
immigrants were not false, the idea of widespread immigrant criminality 
was belied by evidence. In fact, scholarly study indicated the contrary; 
                                                                                                                            
177. Id. at 280 (“We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against the right of a 
State in the absence of legislation by Congress, to protect herself by . . . laws against paupers 
and convicted criminals from abroad . . . .”); Huntington, supra note 9, at 821 (noting the 
significance of this language from Chy Lung, specifically its seeming invitation to state 
immigration regulation in times of federal inaction). 
178. We explain the marginalizing of the role of the federal executive defining federal 
policy below. See infra Part III.B.1. 
179. See Waldman et al., supra note 123. 
180. Mariano Castillo, Crime Stats Test Rationale Behind Arizona Immigration Law, CNN, 
Apr. 29, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-04-29/justice/arizona.immigration.crime_1_sen-
russell-pearce-illegal-immigration-immigration-law?_s=PM:CRIME; Janet Klein, Welcome to 
Hazleton, CBS News (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-
2195789.html. 
181. Andrea Nill Sanchez, Sheriff Joe Arpaio: We Should Send Troops to Mexico, THINK 
PROGRESS (Mar. 16, 2010), http://thinkprogress.org/security/2010/03/16/175949/arpaio-troops-
mexico/ (referring to Arpaio’s appearance on MSNBC News Live on March 16, 2010 where he 
noted that the U.S. government should “send the troops into Mexico” to address violence due to 
illegal immigration).  
182. See, e.g., Lou Dobbs Tonight (Fox Business Network October 5, 2006). 
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immigrants committed fewer crimes than native-borns183 and immigrant-
heavy cities like Houston and states like Arizona were actually facing 
significant declines in violent crime.184  
As Professor Carpenter argues, legislative epidemics are most likely 
when the entrepreneurs’ message is especially sticky.185 Undoubtedly, the 
trope of immigrant criminality is not new to issue entrepreneurs or this last 
decade of immigration discourse. The message of immigrant and foreign 
threat to domestic prosperity, security, and cultural values is a long-held and 
deeply-ingrained trope in American political and legal history.186 It is so 
entrenched in the American political imagination that it resists empirical 
refutation.187 Despite data from economists and sociologists showcasing 
national welfare gains from more liberal migration laws188 and the lack of 
                                                                                                                            
183. Eyal Press, Do Immigrants Make Us Safer?, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), Dec. 3, 2006; 
Ruben G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the The Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment 
Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men, MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE (June 
2006). Crime data by nativity or race is not available for the vast majority of (small) 
municipalities and counties in the United States, and thus cannot be incorporated into our 
analysis of local ordinances in Part I. 
184. Randal C. Archibold, On Border Violence, Truth Pales Compared to Ideas, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 19, 2010 (“[T]he rate of violent crime at the border, and indeed across Arizona, has 
been declining, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”). 
185. Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws 
that Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 21–25 (2010) (describing the use of sticky 
messages to successfully “market” criminal legislation).  
186. See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, The New Politics of Immigration: “Balanced-Budget 
Conservatism” and the Symbolism of Proposition 187, 43 SOC. PROBS. 284 (1996); Pratheepan 
Gulasekaram, Sub-National Immigration Regulation and the Pursuit of Cultural Cohesion, 77 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1441 (2009) (arguing that anti-immigrant regulations impossibly and 
impermissibly attempt to protect perceived cultural values and commonalities); Criminal Aliens, 
FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/issue/criminal-aliens; Ruben G. 
Rumbaut et al., Debunking the The Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First- 
and Second-Generation Young Men, MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE (June 2006), available 
at http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=403.  
187. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of 
Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1710 (2011) (“Although other studies have found 
that illegal immigration significantly benefits state budgets . . . . Roughly three-quarters of 
Americans believe unauthorized immigrants harm the economy . . . .”). 
188. See Howard F. Chang, The Disadvantages of Immigration Restriction as a Policy to 
Improve Income Distribution, 61 SMU L. REV. 23 (2008); Tamar Jacoby, Immigration Nation, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2006, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62090/tamar-
jacoby/immigration-nation. Note that we acknowledge findings that suggest some short-term 
economic losses concentrated at the local level (from medical care and other local public 
services). However, even accounting for those potential losses, evidence overwhelmingly shows 
the net welfare gains from more increased immigration. Further, the objection of concentrated 
local losses could always be addressed through cross-subsidization schemes whereby federal 
windfalls could be distributed to specifically affected municipalities. 
  
 
 
 
44:1431] THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLITICAL 1475 
correlation between immigration and crime,189 public perception about the 
negative impact of increased migration remains largely unchanged.190  
What is innovative about issue entrepreneurs in this specific time period, 
however, are the connections they drew between the purported immigrant 
criminality, homeland security, and subnational immigration policy. They 
successfully blamed so-called sanctuary cities for facilitating and sheltering 
dangerous immigrant criminals and illegal immigrant gangs.191 Conversely, 
if certain cities’ lenient policies were in part responsible for the flourishing 
of immigrant criminal activity, then the corollary must be true: states and 
cities could and should be part of the solution, thereby justifying local 
police participation in immigration enforcement. Protecting domestic 
security in a post-9/11 world, then, was not just about national border 
control; it also required the elimination of sanctuary cities and the increased 
participation of states and cities in criminalizing illegal immigration and 
enforcing immigration law.  
Enter Kris Kobach. While entrepreneurs, media personalities, and 
elected officials were making the rhetorical case for the necessity of state 
and local solutions, Kobach designed legislation for localities, using his 
background in constitutional law to ensure a colorable legal basis for his 
proposals.192 On July 13, 2006, Hazleton, Pennsylvania enacted a Kobach-
authored law, in a well-publicized, real-life instantiation of this theory of 
state and local control.193 A scant four days later, on July 17, 2006, the city 
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Rumbaut et al., supra note 66. 
190.
 
Ruy Teixeira, Public Opinion Watch, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Apr. 5, 
2006), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/04/b1531059.html.  
For example, in the most recent Time poll, 68 percent said illegal 
immigration was a very or extremely serious problem and, in a just-released 
Pew poll on immigration (PDF), 74 percent termed immigration at very big 
or moderately big problem, up from 69 percent in 2002. In the same Pew 
poll, 52 percent now say that “immigrants today are a burden on our country 
because they take our jobs, housing and health care” (up from 38 percent in 
2000), compared to 41 percent who say ”immigrants today strengthen our 
country because of their hard work and talents” (down from 50 percent in 
2000). 
Id.  
191.
 
See, e.g., Lou Dobbs Tonight (CNN television broadcast Oct. 5, 2006) (transcript 
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0610/05/ldt.01.html).  
192.
 
Leah Nelson et al., When Mr. Kobach Comes to Town: Nativist Laws and the 
Communities They Damage, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (Jan. 2011), available at 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/publications/when-mr-kobach-comes-to-town. 
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Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-10 (July 13, 2006), available at 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0003.pdf; see also Nelson et al., 
supra note 192. 
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of Valley Park, Missouri enacted a similar ordinance, also authored by 
Kobach, targeting landlords and local employers.194 From that point, with 
significant media coverage focused on those and similar enactments, 
subnational immigration lawmaking gained significant momentum.195 In our 
analysis of data from the National Council of State Legislatures, the most 
significant spike in restrictive state legislation also occurred during this 
time, more than tripling from 2005 to 2006 (from fifteen to fourty-nine), 
and then doubling in 2007 (to ninety-eight laws enacted). Again, it is worth 
recalling that this surge occurred during a national economic boom, with 
low unemployment. 
Obama First Term (2009 to 2012): During the Bush Presidency, issue 
entrepreneurs built their organizations and began organizing their multilevel 
strategy. In the early part of the decade, they took advantage of a post-9/11 
context, which allowed them to conflate terrorism and immigration 
concerns and increase party polarization, which allowed them to solidify a 
restrictionist stance as a lame-duck President’s influence within his party 
waned.196 By the time Obama began his Presidency, issue entrepreneurs 
were riding the strong momentum of their victory in derailing 2007 
bipartisan federal reform and the enactment of several high-profile 
subfederal laws, like the Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2008 and Hazleton-
type laws in places as far flung as Farmers Branch, Texas and Riverside, 
New Jersey.197 During the past four years, issue entrepreneurs have grown 
prominent and entrenched, and their work has become systematized and 
evident. 
While party polarization has generally stalled many initiatives at the 
federal level, Obama was successful in mobilizing federal legislative 
majorities to end “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and to pass a federal health care 
overhaul. Despite being able to herd enough votes to pass health care 
legislation—an area of traditional state dominance with strong libertarian 
                                                                                                                            
194.
 
Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 1708 (July 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/valleypark_ordinance.pdf; see also Nelson et al., 
supra note 192. 
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Aaron Couch, State Illegal Immigration Laws: What Have They Accomplished?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 23, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/ 
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Joe Klein, Bush’s Last Days: The Lamest Duck, TIME MAG. (Nov. 26, 2008), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1862464,00.html. 
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ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to -216 (2008); Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 
2903 (Jan. 22, 2007), available at https://www.farmersbranch.info/sites/default/files/Ordinance 
%20No%202903.pdf, invalidated by Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 
F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Riverside, N.J., Ordinance 2006-16 (July 26, 2006), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/riverside_firstordinance.pdf.  
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valences—the Obama administration has been unable to make any progress 
on immigration, an area traditionally relegated to federal control.198 Indeed, 
in late 2010, Congress was unable to pass the DREAM Act, one of the most 
popular individual pieces of the 2007 comprehensive reform package (and 
even now a measure with broad public support).199 In a coordinated effort, 
FAIR and NumbersUSA, along with the Center for Immigration Studies, 
ensured that the DREAM Act proposal would not survive a Senate 
filibuster. Completing the project begun in 2001, issue entrepreneurs’ 
exacerbation of party polarization on immigration meant that by the 2010 
DREAM Act vote, no moderate Republicans remained to help break the 
filibuster and effectuate national majoritarian preferences.200   
While that federal legislative effort stalled, border security and enhanced 
enforcement by the Department of Homeland Security continue. In efforts 
to bring enough Republicans (sufficient to break the filibuster) to the 
negotiating table on the DREAM Act or other immigration reforms, the 
President used his executive power to make enforcement concessions that 
angered his own party’s base but that were also seemingly designed to bring 
polarized restrictionists to the negotiating table and begin bipartisan reform. 
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envision an active and deliberative role for the restrictionist issue entrepreneur, in creating 
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the Court’s recent turn against campaign finance regulation. At least one scholar predicts that 
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For example, President Obama used his executive power to order National 
Guard troops to the border, and his administration has been deporting 
immigrants at record rates.201 These executive concessions, however, have 
not succeeded in breaking the hold of issue entrepreneurs over the number 
of lawmakers necessary to overcome a filibuster and enact immigration 
reform or popular parts of such reform.  
Stepped up national enforcement, moreover, has not mollified 
restrictionist critics, either at organizations such as NumbersUSA or among 
conservative media personalities. With the departure of Dobbs from CNN in 
2009, groups such as FAIR now rely more heavily on conservative talk 
radio hosts and special events such as the annual “Hold their Feet to the 
Fire” conference in Washington, D.C., where the organization brings 
together dozens of conservative radio hosts to focus on illegal immigration 
and immigration enforcement, combined with rallies, visits to wavering 
legislators, and guest appearances by sympathetic members of Congress.202 
As the New York Times noted, such events allow FAIR to maintain its own 
race-neutrality while its associates are free to invoke ethnic nationalist 
frames: “This year’s event mixed discussion of job losses among minorities 
with calls to use Tomahawk missiles on Tijuana drug lords, while a doubter 
of President Obama’s birth certificate referred to ‘the undocumented 
worker’ in the White House.”203 And concerns about national security and 
sovereignty continue to remain salient, as prominent radio personalities 
such as Roger Hedgecock continue to press the notion that Mexican drug 
cartels control vast portions of the Southwest.204 
Meanwhile, subnational legislative activity continues unabated, most 
notably at the state level. Even as the Department of Justice sues to enjoin 
one enactment, issue entrepreneurs create others, each one subject to federal 
challenge, and each consuming federal prosecutorial and judicial resources. 
Moreover, each subsequent enactment appears to expand the boundaries of 
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state and local enforcement activities, adding increasingly punitive policies 
with each step. Discussing a provision of the Alabama law he authored, 
Kobach noted a new provision that made the state “the first . . . to invalidate 
all contracts entered into with illegal immigrants. A strict reading of the law 
could mean that any contract, including mortgages, apartment leases and 
basic work agreements, can be ruled null and void.”205 Importantly, Kobach 
has also pushed back against national efforts to enshrine restrictive 
measures such as E-Verify in 2012, arguing that such bills would “establish 
a fairly toothless E-Verify requirement while defanging the only 
government bodies that are serious about enforcing immigration law — the 
states.”206 
While expanding the scope of subnational laws with each enactment, 
entrepreneurial strategy has also matured and systematized with regard to 
venue selection. Prospectively, the Polarized Change model utilizes the 
mechanics of the decentralized and federated party system to unlock the 
predictive power of party polarization. While party polarization helps issue 
entrepreneurs advance their policy positions and keep immigration 
restriction high on the party agenda, it concurrently allows observers to 
predict where the entrepreneurs are likely to strike next. As our data 
showcases, rather than look to areas of significant demographic or 
economic change, issue entrepreneurs are more likely to look to areas of 
Republican party domination with enterprising candidates and officials, 
regardless of the underlying demographic factors.207 Thus, for instance, the 
November 2011 switch of the Mississippi House of Representatives from 
Democrat to Republican for the first time since Reconstruction has meant 
that the House will no longer be able to bottle up legislation in committees 
controlled by Democrats.208 Notably, Mississippi ranks as the third-lowest 
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state in terms of immigrant share of the resident population (two percent of 
the total population in 2010), and this grew from about 1.5 percent of the 
population in 2000.209 Finally, even in states with more sizable new 
immigrant populations, such as North Carolina, partisan dynamics seem to 
be of paramount importance. As NumbersUSA reported on the conditions in 
North Carolina for its State and Local alert: “with Republicans now in 
control of the state legislature in North Carolina, efforts have begun to pass 
similar, statewide legislation to crack down on illegal immigration.”210  
Meanwhile, the major judicial development of the last four years was the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona v. United States,211 in which the Obama 
Justice Department sued to enjoin the state’s immigration enforcement 
scheme.212 The Court struck down three of the four provisions at issue, but 
preserved, for the time being, the provision directing local police to check 
the immigration status of suspected individuals.213 Both majority and 
dissenting opinions in Arizona are notable for their adoption of the narrative 
of issue entrepreneurs—of state and local pressure in the wake of federal 
impotence. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion sympathized with the state’s 
purported immigration woes, stating “[t]he pervasiveness of federal 
regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to the 
States. Arizona bears many of the consequences of unlawful 
immigration.”214 Justice Scalia’s dissent made specific factual claims, with 
no evidentiary citation: 
Arizona bears the brunt of the country’s illegal immigration 
problem. Its citizens feel themselves under siege by large numbers 
of illegal immigrants who invade their property, strain their social 
services, and even place their lives in jeopardy. Federal officials 
have been unable to remedy the problem, and indeed have recently 
shown that they are unwilling to do so.
215
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Thus, the true measure of entrepreneurial success in Arizona may not be the 
salvaging of one of its enforcement provisions but rather the Supreme Court 
accepting the narrative that state and local immigration laws are necessary 
to “fix” federal failures.  
The Court’s preservation of the so-called “show me your papers” 
provision emboldened Arizona officials, as well as those in other states who 
have either passed or are considering state immigration enforcement bills.216 
They appear to have read Arizona as a victory for state and local 
immigration regulation, rejuvenating their restrictionist stances, as 
Alabama’s attorney general remarked, “[t]oday the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that state law enforcement can play an important role in 
assisting the federal government in fulfilling its responsibility to enforce 
[federal immigration law].”217  
While it remains to be seen whether these types of statements are mere 
rhetoric in the face of a disappointing result for restrictionists, states and 
localities are still left with significant room to maneuver after Arizona. First, 
among SB 1070’s provisions that were not presented for Court review—and 
are therefore good law in the state—are the law’s purpose statement and its 
statewide preemption of local sanctuary ordinances.218 Importantly, SB 
1070’s statement of purpose announces “attrition through enforcement” as 
the state’s explicit goal, and its survival is at least symbolically significant 
for subfederal immigration involvement. Second, Arizona’s injunction of 
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three of SB 1070’s provisions does not resolve the constitutionality of the 
other types of state enforcement provisions at issue in other state and local 
enactments. For example, it remains unclear whether localities can enact 
rental ordinances219 or whether Alabama’s provision invalidating contracts 
entered into by unauthorized immigrants or its law collecting immigration 
status information at public schools are constitutional.220 It would take at 
least another Supreme Court case to address, let alone resolve, those 
outstanding attempts at state and local immigration regulation. 
Finally, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Arizona not only relied on 
empirically unsound claims, it was also conspicuously political.221 In a few 
paragraphs, Scalia criticized President Obama’s decision to defer 
prosecution of certain young, law-abiding undocumented students as an 
“unwise” use of federal funds.222 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit 
described Scalia’s critique as “fighting words” and “inflammatory,” noting 
that the Administration’s program was announced after Arizona was argued 
and appears nowhere in the record of the case.223 The exchange suggests 
that the politicized nature of immigration policy proliferation may be 
extending even further than Congress and state and local legislative bodies 
to the U.S. Supreme Court itself. 
To summarize, during the Obama Presidency, we witnessed the fruition 
of the entrepreneurial vision: engendered gridlock at the national level at 
key moments of potential bipartisan compromise, providing the rhetorical 
hook and policy vacuum necessary to proliferate state and local legislation. 
This legislative landscape has become so normalized that Presidential 
hopeful Mitt Romney promised that his putative administration would 
“support states like South Carolina and Arizona that are stepping forward to 
address this problem [of illegal immigration].”224 Far from the 2000–2001 
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Bush platform of bipartisan federal reform, focused on meeting labor needs 
and increasing legal immigration, this new vision imagines states and 
localities as the primary bulwarks against a flood of unauthorized 
immigration to the United States. 
III. A PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF POLARIZED 
CHANGE 
Our purpose in this paper has been to foreground the politicized nature of 
immigration policy and to provide a thick description of the mechanism 
fomenting both state and local policy proliferation, and federal policy 
stagnation. This description, based on extensive quantitative and qualitative 
investigation, lays the groundwork for a fundamental rethinking of the 
current judicial and scholarly appraisals of this recent spate of state and 
local immigration regulation. We leave that task for a future project,225 but 
we briefly note some of those implications. 
Because restrictionist issue entrepreneurs appear to be engaging a 
strategy of judicial, rather than congressional, engagement, the Polarized 
Change model challenges some of the basic tenets of federalism analysis. 
When state and local policy proliferation is motivated by political, rather 
than regional demographic challenges, the purported values of decentralized 
decisionmaking are highly compromised. In short, states and localities cease 
to be idealized “laboratories” of policy experimentation and fail to produce 
instructive responses to demographic problems.226 Rather, by highlighting 
the salience of ethnic nationalism, the polarized change model suggests that 
courts should consider equality-based, as opposed to structural power, 
frameworks to evaluate the constitutionality of state and local immigration 
laws.  
More globally, both courts and commentators must abandon functionalist 
explanations of state and local immigration regulation. While scholars have 
carved out important normative space for state and local immigrant efforts 
to integrate immigrants, they have done so by adopting the unsupported 
demographic assumptions popularized by issue entrepreneurs. Moreover, 
Polarized Change challenges “steam-valve” theories of immigration 
federalism which maintain that isolated subfederal enactments are desirable 
because they dissipate restrictionist or anti-immigrant sentiment at the local 
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level, thereby relieving the pressure to enact those laws at the federal level. 
Polarized Change, however, suggests that proliferating policies in 
politically receptive subfederal jurisdictions builds, rather than dissipates, 
pressure for restrictive action at the federal level and, more generally, 
enshrines a more restrictionist status quo. These critical developments 
require extensive and detailed analysis, which we pursue elsewhere.  
For the better part of the last decade, states and localities have markedly 
increased their immigration-related lawmaking. Our prior statistical analysis 
has shown that these laws are rarely driven by pressing demographic 
problems and that local political contexts are better predictors of restrictive 
action. Further, we have argued that the federal gridlock purportedly 
compelling these state and local laws is not merely a “given.” Instead, it is 
purposefully engineered by restrictive issue entrepreneurs who seek to 
proliferate restrictionist legislation at the subfederal level. Thus, our new 
theory of immigration regulation elegantly accounts for both federal 
legislative stagnation and state and local policy proliferation.  
This theory of Polarized Change, however, is only possible when we 
search beyond purely legal and functional accounts of the rise of subfederal 
immigration law. Importantly, we must understand the fundamental ways in 
which the politics of immigration influence policy expression, subtly 
shifting constitutional norms, and influencing judicial actors and scholarly 
commentary. We believe this paper provides a necessary corrective to this 
trend of apoliticized, demography-based evaluations of this rising 
phenomenon. More significantly, by showing how these extra-constitutional 
factors inherently affect legal appraisal of these phenomena, we hope that 
courts, commentators, elected officials, media actors, and the general public 
will modulate their responses based on this more accurate understanding. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A. Description of our City and State Data Sets 
We start with a baseline of cities (defined as “places” in most states, but 
also including “county subdivisions” in others). Next, we obtained lists of 
cities that have proposed restrictive ordinances and regulations from various 
sources, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the Puerto Rican 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Fair Immigration Reform 
Movement, the National Immigration Law Center, and the Migration Policy 
Institute. We then validated these lists by making phone calls to 
jurisdictions noted as considering or passing ordinances, as well as by 
monitoring news stories on local ordinances. The data on city ordinances 
become far less reliable after 2007, with a sharp decline in newspaper 
reports of new municipal ordinances and no further tracking of municipal 
legislation by national advocacy groups. 
We merged information on the proposal and passage of ordinances with 
census data on various demographic factors. The census data are primarily 
from 2000.  
Finally, we came up with a measure of state-level legislative activity on 
immigrant integration based on reports from the National Conference of 
State Legislatures from 2005, 2006, and 2007, and we included any 
measures that bear a significant relationship to illegal immigration. Two 
graduate research assistants were instructed to code the bills an ordinal scale 
of 1:“low impact” and 2:“high impact” on immigrant rights and/or access to 
benefits, based on the provision’s likely effects on immigrant life chances 
and the number of immigrants likely to be effected. Since these two 
categories offered a stark distinction, inter-coder reliability was ninety-four 
percent. In the cases where two codes conflicted, the principal investigator 
(Ramakrishnan) provided the tie-breaking vote. Finally, when we use state-
level activity as a contextual variable in our municipal dataset, we use a net 
total measure of such activity, given multiple laws passed in various states, 
including a mix of permissive and restrictive ones. 
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Appendix B. Multivariate Regression Analyses 
Table B.1. Logit Regression Estimations of Municipal Ordinances 
 Proposal Passage 
 Restrictive Pro Restrictive Pro 
Republican majority in 
county 
0.967*** -1.406*** 1.454*** -1.430*** 
[5.222] [-8.675] [9.942] [-8.970] 
Percent naturalized in 
population 
-0.027 -0.037 0.01 -0.042 
[-1.243] [-1.968] [0.612] [-2.268] 
Growth in immigrant 
population, 2000-2007 
0 -0.013*** 0 -0.012*** 
[-0.481] [-48.159] [-0.885] [-47.768] 
Agriculture jobs (share) -0.046 0.001 -0.183* -0.001 
[-2.896] [0.086] [-14.463] [-0.039] 
Percent of immigrants 
who are recent arrivals 
0.004 0.027*** 0.01 0.027*** 
[1.356] [9.385] [3.955] [9.578] 
Overcrowded households 
(% of total) 
0.024 0.061* 0.037 0.068** 
[0.810] [2.409] [1.606] [2.717] 
White poverty rate -0.009 0.038** -0.02 0.036** 
[-0.779] [3.794] [-2.191] [3.652] 
Black poverty rate 0.006 0.003 -0.003 0.003 
[1.537] [0.842] [-1.214] [1.011] 
Population (ln) 0.672*** 1.426*** 0.712*** 1.412*** 
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[12.147] [29.456] [16.298] [29.648] 
State policy climate 0.025 0.001 0.032 -0.002 
[0.980] [0.061] [1.630] [-0.080] 
Constant -11.631*** -19.717*** -12.893*** -19.579*** 
Observations 16,384 16,384 16,384 16,384 
Pseudo-R2 0.12 0.48 0.16 0.48 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, based on two-
sided tests. Significance (p) values in brackets 
Note: Number of observations reduced because of missing data on nativity in cities 
below 6,000 residents. Poverty rates from 2000 census because of missing data on 
black poverty rates in an additional 7,176 cities. 
Table B.2. Regression Estimations of Restrictive State Laws Enacted, 2005-2010 
Republican share of voters 
0.156** 
[0.441] 
Percent of immigrants who are recent arrivals 
-0.0536 
[-0.116] 
Growth of Latino population 
0.0521 
[0.219] 
White poverty 
0.139 
[0.113] 
Black poverty 
-0.0285 
[-0.0605] 
  
 
 
 
1488 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
Agriculture jobs (share of total) 
-0.504* 
[-0.391] 
Constant 
-4.28 
[0.000760] 
Observations 50 
R-square 0.22 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, based on two-
sided tests. Significance (p) values in brackets. 
Note: The dependent variable is no major laws, one major law, two or more major 
laws. 
 
